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I. INTRODUCTION
The Minnesota Legislature recognizes the abuse of children as
a crime that warrants our attention and our action. The legisla-
ture utilizes the criminal code to accord special protection to
abused children1 and authorizes court ordered services for any
family where even one abused child can be found.' In the arena
of family law, the legislature places the burden on an abusive
parent to prove that visitation, much less custody, will serve the
child's best interests.'
Despite efforts to address child abuse in Minnesota's criminal
and family codes, acts of physical and sexual abuse, by them-
selves, do not warrant termination of a parent's rights unless the
parent is convicted of causing the death of a natural or adopted
child.4 As a result, a petitioner for termination of parental rights
(TPR) must not only prove that termination would serve the
abused child's best interests, but also that the abuse falls into at
least one of eight statutory categories warranting involuntary
termination.5
This outdated legislative framework not only places children
at risk, but it compels children's legal advocates to creatively
place abusive conduct within the parameters of the TPR statute.
This creative legal drafting is necessitated by the legislature's fail-
ure to include child abuse as an independent ground for termi-
nation in the TPR statute.
This Article analyzes the scope of child abuse in Minnesota
and the nation. It also discusses the Minnesota Legislature's re-
sponse to child abuse, and accords specific attention to the five
statutory grounds that are currently considered in parental
rights actions where a parent has abused a child. Finally, this
Article highlights the shortcomings of the present statute and
offers a proposed amendment to the TPR statute.
1. See infra notes 44-49 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 75-85 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
4. See MINN. STAT. § 260.221, subd. 1(b)(6)(1992).
5. See infra note 110.
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II. THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM
In recent years, there has been a disturbing increase in re-
ported incidents of abused and neglected children. In 1986,
over 1.5 million children were reported as victims of abuse or
neglect.6 This figure rose to 2.5 million in 1990.' Reports of
child sexual abuse increased even more dramatically, from 1975
in 1976 to 155,000 in 1986.8
These statistics, however, do not reflect the sea of abused chil-
dren whose plight is unreported. A 1985 household survey of
parents reveals that 1.5 million children suffer from "very severe"
physical abuse and that 6.9 million children are victimized by
some form of caretaker violence.9 With respect to sexual abuse,
studies indicate that as many as thirty-eight percent of all women
and sixteen percent of all men have been subjected to childhood
sexual abuse.10
Increasingly, child abuse victims pay with their lives. One
study reports that, in 1991, 1383 children died as a result of
abuse or neglect,1 a ten percent increase from the previous
year. 2 According to Dr. Ann Cohn, Executive Director of the
National Committee for Prevention of Child Abuse, four chil-
dren die each day as a result of maltreatment, and 7300 children
are reported as victims of abuse or neglect.' 3
Minnesota is not immune to the dramatic increase in child
abuse cases. From 1984 to 1991, reports of child abuse and ne-
glect increased approximately twenty-five percent from 13,841 to
6. DEBRA WHITCOMB, CHILD VICTIMS As WITNESSES: WHAT THE RESEARCH SAYS 1
(1993) (citing NATIONAL CTR. ON CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT, STUDY FINDINGS: STUDY OF
NATIONAL INCIDENCE AND PREVALENCE OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT (1988)).
7. Id. (citing AMERICAN HUMANE ASS'N, NATIONAL ANALYSIS OF OFFICIAL CHILD NE-
GLECT AND ABUSE REPORTING (1990); NATIONAL COMM. FOR THE PREVENTION OF CHILD
ABUSE, CURRENT TRENDS IN CHILD ABUSE REPORTING AND FATALITIES (1990)).
8. Id. (citing NATIONAL CTR. ON CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT, STUDY FINDINGS: STUDY
OF NATIONAL INCIDENCE AND PREVALENCE OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT (1988)).
9. Id. (citing M. Straus & R. Gelles, How Violent are American Families? Esti-
mates from the National Family Violence Resurvey and Other Studies, in FAMILY ABUSE
AND ITS CONSEQUENCES: NEW DIRECTIONS IN RESEARCH (G. Hotaling et al. eds., 1988)).
10. Id. (citing D. Finkelhor, SEXUALLY VICTIMIZED CHILDREN (1979); D. Finkelhor et
al., Sexual Abuse in a National Survey of Adult Men and Women: Prevalence, Characteristics,
and Risk Factors, 14 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT, 19-29 (1990); D. Russell, The Incidence and
Prevalence of Intrafamilial and Extrafamilial Sexual Abuse of Female Children, 7 CHILD ABUSE
& NEGLECT, 133-46 (1983)).
11. Child Abuse Deaths Rise, NATIONAL CTR. FOR PROSECUTION OF CHILD ABUSE UP-
DATE (American Prosecutors Research Inst., Alexandria, Va.), Mar. 1992, at 2.
12. Id.
13. Id.
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19,575.14 The reports received in 1991 involved 26,345 alleged
child victims.1 5 Between 1984 and 1991, reports alleging child
physical abuse increased by forty-four percent, from 5635 to
8124.16 Approximately forty percent of these cases resulted in a
determination that abuse had occurred.
17
In contrast, reports of sexual abuse from 1984 to 1991 de-
clined by thirty-six percent, from 3662 to 2342.1' Throughout
this time period, approximately forty-five percent of the sexual
maltreatment reports resulted in a determination that sexual
abuse had occurred.19 It is likely that some portion of those chil-
dren whose cases of alleged physical or sexual abuse could not
be substantiated because of insufficient evidence were also
victimized. °
When allegations of abuse are substantiated, the local welfare
agency is directed by statute to offer those services necessary to
prevent further abuse and to preserve the family "whenever pos-
sible." 1 When the abuse is so egregious to necessitate removing
the child from the home, the agency is required to exercise this
authority.
22
14. FAMILY & CHILDREN'S SERVS. Dv., MINNESOTA DEP'T OF HUMAN SERVS., MINNE-
SOTA CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT: STATEWIDE STATISTICS/TRENDS 1 (1992) (on file with
William Mitchell Law Review) [hereinafter DHS REPORT].
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. DHS REPORT, supra note 14, at 1.
20. It can be argued that, when there is insufficient evidence to allow intervention,
the mere fact that an investigation took place may subject the child to retaliatory abuse
by the perpetrator. There are two shortcomings to this argument, however. First, it is
not always necessary to alert the alleged perpetrator that a child has been interviewed
or that the child may have indicated abuse. Where reasonable grounds exist, the court
may grant a local welfare agency's motion to withhold notice of the occurrence of the
interview from a parent, legal custodian, or guardian. MINN. STAT. § 626.556, subd.
10(c) (1992 & Supp. 1993).
Second, it is presumed that child abuse is not an isolated event but is an integral
part of the family unit. PAMELA D. MAYHALL & KATHERINE EASTLACK NORGARD, CHILD
ABUSE AND NEGLECT vii (1983). Thus, while an unsubstantiated investigation may serve
as an "excuse" for a perpetrator to abuse a child, the family dynamic of abuse would
likely resurface with or without an investigation.
On the other hand, even an unsubstantiated report of abuse may benefit an
abused child. The process of the investigation may alert authorities, neighbors, educa-
tors, and others that the child is a suspected victim. If the process causes these parties
to keep a close eye on the child, additional evidence may eventually be obtained.
21. MINN. STAT. § 626.556, subd. 10(a) (1992 & Supp. 1993).
22. Id.
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In Minnesota, the cost of out-of-home placement for ne-
glected and abused children constitutes the single largest expen-
diture of community social service money."3 Between 1986 and
1991, the total number of Minnesota children placed out of the
home increased thirty-one percent.24 As many as one-third of
these children are placed as a result of being abused.25 In Min-
nesota, four out of five of these children are eventually reunited
with their parents or close relatives.26
It is often difficult, however, to reunite victims of physical or
sexual abuse with their offending parents. Parents charged with
abuse or neglect of a child "are not candidates for quick change"
and often require "long-term treatment and long-term support
in order to achieve any measure of success. "27 One study con-
cludes that the success rate of treating abusive parents may be as
low as forty percent.
28
For social workers, the greatest challenge may be to help a
nonoffending parent accept the fact that abuse has taken
place. 29 Typically, "[n] on-offending parents tend to lie to cover
for the guilty parent because of their emotional ties to that per-
son."3" The following example illustrates this problem.3'
A three-year-old boy was hospitalized with severe burns. Ac-
cording to his doctors, the burns were consistent with immersion
and not consistent with the splattering type of burns that result
from an accidental spill. The child related that his mother had
placed him in hot water as punishment for playing with the tele-
phone. Irrespective of the evidence, the child's mother denied
the abuse. Moreover, the "whole family denied the obvious cir-
cumstances of his injuries. "32 The social worker was "constantly
23. DHS REPORT, supra note 14, at 1.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. MAYHALL & NORGARD, supra note 20, at 348-49 (emphasis added).
28. Id. at 348.
29. Joy MAUGANS GARLAND, AMERICA'S THROWAWAY CHILDREN 23 (1990).
30. Id. If the nonoffending parent has also been abused by the same perpetrator,
fear of retaliation may prevent the nonoffending parent from supporting the child.
Minnesota's criminal code reflects this possibility and provides that a parent who know-
ingly permits the continuing physical or sexual abuse of a child cannot be convicted of
child neglect or endangerment if "there was a reasonable apprehension ... that acting
to stop or prevent the neglect or endangerment would result in substantial bodily harm
to the [parent] or the child in retaliation." MINN. STAT. § 609.378, subd. 2 (1992).
31. This example is adapted from GARLAND, supra note 29, at 23-24.
32. Id. at 23-24.
1994]
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involved" with the family during the months of hearings. 3 The
family eventually despised the social worker and accused her of
racism. 4 Helping the family "was like trying to pull tiger's
teeth."35 In the end, the child's father realized that his wife had
abused their son, the family split up, and the child's siblings
were placed with an aunt.36
The failure to provide for the prompt, permanent placement
of a child can be devastating. According to one commentator,
"the instability of foster-home placements and the series of
moves that many foster children experience [results in] .. .
problems in developing trust in others and a sense of appropri-
ate autonomy. Complicating these factors is the directive given
to many foster parents that they should not become close to
these children."
37
The Minnesota Supreme Court has agreed that continual al-
teration of a parent-child relationship does not serve the child's
best interest.38 The United States Supreme Court has echoed
these sentiments, stating:
It is undisputed that children require secure, stable, long-
term, continuous relationships with their parents or foster
parents. There is little that can be as detrimental to a child's
sound development as uncertainty over whether he [or she] is
to remain in his [or her] current "home," under the care of
his [or her] parents or foster parents, especially when such
uncertainty is prolonged.39
Consequently, the challenge of the child protection system is
not only to spare children from further abuse, but also to
33. Id. at 24.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. GARLAND, supra note 29, at 24.
37. DR. KEN MAGID & CAROLE A. McKELVEy, HIGH RISK 150-51 (1987); see also In re
N.C.K, 411 N.W.2d 577, 582 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (noting that long-term foster care is
contrary to the best interests of children).
38. In re K.T., 327 N.W.2d 13, 18 (Minn. 1982). The court noted that "[o]nly the
most serious circumstances justify tampering with this most fundamental relationship."
Id.
39. Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Serv. Agency, 458 U.S. 502, 513-14
(1982); see also Patrick R. Tamilia, A Response to Elimination of the Reasonable Efforts Re-
quired Prior to Termination of Parental Rights Status, 54 U. Prrr. L. REv. 211, 216-17 (1992)
(discussing the trauma to the child who is removed from caregivers during important
developmental stages). See generally David J. Herring, Inclusion of the Reasonable Efforts
Requirement in Termination of Parental Rights Statutes: Punishing the Child for the Failures of
the State Child Welfare System, 54 U. Prrr. L. REv. 139, 144-50 (1992) (discussing the harm
to children caused by long-term placement in temporary foster care).
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promptly reunite those children with their parents.4" If prompt
and safe reunification is not possible, other permanency plans
must be made when doing so would serve the child's best
interests.
III. MINNESOTA'S RESPONSE TO CHILD ABUSE
Minnesota's statutory laws recognize child abuse as a social ill
and specifically address this social ill in a variety of provisions.
Minnesota law protects child abuse victims through the criminal
code which punishes child abusers,41 through the child protec-
tion statutes which provide a range of services,42 and through
the family code which places the abused child's interests as supe-
rior to those of the abusive parent.43 An examination of these
statutes demonstrates the depth of Minnesota's commitment to
the victims of child abuse.
A. Criminal Code
Minnesota's criminal code protects physically and sexually
abused children. Persons who deprive a child of necessary food,
clothing, shelter, or supervision are guilty of criminal neglect.
44
40. Minnesota law currently requires that the case plan prepared for abused chil-
dren must include provisions for services to end the abuse that are aimed at "preserving
family life whenever possible." MINN. STAT. § 626.556, subd. 10(a) (1992 & Supp.
1993). Moreover, the court must ensure that services provided for abused children
"prevent placement or ... eliminate the need for removal and . . .reunite the child
with the child's family at the earliest possible time. .. " Id. § 260.012(a) (1992).
41. See infra notes 44-51 and accompanying text.
42. See infra notes 52-85 and accompanying text.
43. See infta notes 86-109 and accompanying text.
44. MINN. STAT. § 609.378 (1992 & Supp. 1993). This statute provides as follows:
Subd. 1. Persons guilty of neglect or endangerment. (a) Neglect.
(1) A parent, legal guardian, or caretaker who willfully deprives a child of
necessary food, clothing, shelter, health care, or supervision appropriate to
the child's age, when the parent, guardian, or caretaker is reasonably able to
make the necessary provisions and the deprivation harms or is likely to sub-
stantially harm the child's physical, mental, or emotional health is guilty of
neglect of a child and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than
one year or to payment of a fine of not more than $3,000, or both. If the
deprivation results in substantial harm to the child's physical, mental, or emo-
tional health, the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more
than five years or to payment of a fine of not more than $10,000, or both. If a
parent, guardian, or caretaker responsible for the child's care in good faith
selects and depends upon spiritual means or prayer for treatment or care of
disease or remedial care of the child, this treatment or care is "health care,"
for purposes of this clause.
(2) A parent, legal guardian, or caretaker who knowingly permits the
continuing physical or sexual abuse of a child is guilty of neglect of a child and
19941
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Several statutes address crimes of physical abuse. Cruel or exces-
sive punishment is specifically proscribed as "malicious punish-
ment" of a child.45 Under this statute, the offense can be
classified as a gross misdemeanor or a felony, depending on the
may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than one year or to payment
of a fine of not more than $3,000, or both.
(b) Endangerment. A parent, legal guardian, or caretaker who endan-
gers the child's person or health by
(1) intentionally or recklessly causing or permitting a child to be placed
in a situation likely to substantially harm the child's physical, mental, or emo-
tional health or cause the child's death; or
(2) knowingly causing or permitting the child to be present where any
person is selling or possessing a controlled substance, as defined in section
152.01, subdivision 4, in violation of section 152.021, 152.022, 152.023, or
152.024; is guilty of child endangerment and may be sentenced to imprison-
ment for not more than one year or to payment of a fine of not more than
$3,000, or both.
If the endangerment results in substantial harm to the child's physical,
mental, or emotional health, the person may be sentenced to imprisonment
for not more than five years or to payment of a fine of not more than $10,000,
or both.
This paragraph does not prevent a parent, legal guardian, or caretaker
from causing or permitting a child to engage in activities that are appropriate
to the child's age, stage of development, and experience, or from selecting
health care as defined in subdivision 1, paragraph (a).
(c) Endangerment by firearm access. A person who intentionally or reck-
lessly causes a child under 14 years of age to be placed in a situation likely to
substantially harm the child's physical health or cause the child's death as a
result of the child's access to a loaded firearm is guilty of child endangerment
and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than one year or to
payment of a fine of not more than $3,000, or both.
If the endangerment results in substantial harm to the child's physical
health, the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than five
years or to payment of a fine of not more than $10,000, or both.
Subd. 2. Defenses. It is a defense to a prosecution under subdivision 1,
paragraph (a), clause (2), or paragraph (b), that at the time of the neglect or
endangerment there was a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the de-
fendant that acting to stop or prevent the neglect or endangerment would
result in substantial bodily harm to the defendant or the child in retaliation.
Id.
45. Id. § 609.377 (1992). This statute provides as follows:
A parent, legal guardian, or caretaker who, by an intentional act or a se-
ries of intentional acts with respect to a child, evidences unreasonable force or
cruel discipline that is excessive under the circumstances is guilty of malicious
punishment of a child and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more
than one year or to payment of a fine of not more than $3,000.00, or both. If
the punishment results in substantial bodily harm, that person may be sen-
tenced to imprisonment for not more than five years or to payment of a fine of
not more than $10,000.00, or both. If the punishment results in great bodily
harm, that person may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than ten
years or to payment of a fine of not more than $20,000.00, or both.
[Vol. 20
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severity of the harm caused to the child.46  Unreasonable re-
straint of a child is also specifically proscribed.47
Minnesota also maintains enhancement statutes that classify
an assault against a child as a felony when there has been a past
pattern of abuse.4" If the child dies under circumstances mani-
festing extreme indifference to human life and there has been a
past pattern of child abuse, the perpetrator is guilty of first de-
gree murder.49
Minnesota also has several statutes that prohibit sexual abuse
of children. Many of these statutes are divided into subdivisions
according to the age of the child, the age of the perpetrator, and
the identity of the perpetrator. 50 Parents and stepparents are de-
46. Id.
47. MINN. STAT. § 609.255 (1992). This statute provides as follows:
Subdivision 1. Definition. As used in this section, the following term has
the meaning given it unless specific content indicates otherwise.
"Caretaker" means an individual who has responsibility for the care of a
child as a result of a family relationship, or who has assumed responsibility for
all or a portion of the care of a child.
Subd. 2. Intentional restraint. Whoever, knowingly lacking lawful author-
ity to do so, intentionally confines or restrains someone else's child under the
age of 18 years without consent of the child's parent or legal custodian, or any
other person without the person's consent, is guilty of false imprisonment and
may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than three years or to pay-
ment of a fine of not more than $5,000.00, or both.
Subd. 3. Unreasonable restraint of children. A parent, legal guardian, or
caretaker who intentionally subjects a child under the age of 18 years to unrea-
sonable physical confinement or restraint by means including but not limited
to, tying, locking, caging, or chaining for a prolonged period of time and in a
cruel manner which is excessive under the circumstances, is guilty of unrea-
sonable restraint of a child and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not
more than one year or to payment of a fine of not more than $3,000.00, or
both. If the confinement or restraint results in substantial bodily harm, that
person may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than five years or to
payment of a fine of not more than $10,000.00, or both.
Id.
48. Id. § 609.223, subd. 2 (1992). This statute provides that "[w]hoever assaults a
minor may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than five years or to payment of
a fine of not more than $10,000.00, or both, if the perpetrator has engaged in a past
pattern of child abuse against the minor." Id.
49. Id. § 609.185(5) (1992); see, e.g., State v. Olson, 436 N.W.2d 817, 821 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1989), review denied, (Minn. Apr. 26, 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 862 (1989).
50. Sexual intercourse or contact with a child under the age of 13 is strictly prohib-
ited and neither mistake about the child's age nor consent are recognized defenses.
MINN. STAT. § 609.342, subd. l(a) (1992); see also MINN. STAT. §§ 609.342, subd. 1(b);
609.343, subd. 1(a) (1992); 609.344, subd. 1(a) (1992 & Supp. 1993); 609.345, subd.
1(a) (1992 & Supp. 1993).
Classification of crimes against children ages 13-16 depends on the age and iden-
tity of the perpetrator. See, e~g., Id. §§ 609.342, subd. I(b),(g) (1992); 609.345, subd.
l(b),(e)-(g) (1992 & Supp. 1993).
1994]
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fined as having a significant relationship with the child and are
specifically prohibited from sexually abusing their children.5
B. Child Protection Statutes
Minnesota requires that teachers, doctors, police officers, day-
care providers, psychiatrists, and other professionals "immedi-
ately" report to the authorities when they suspect that a child has
been physically or sexually abused by a parent. 52 The mandated
reporting law represents the legislature's recognition that a
child's "health or welfare may be jeopardized through physical
abuse,. neglect, or sexual abuse."53 A mandated reporter who
fails to comply with the statute faces civil 54 and criminal
penalties.55
A local welfare agency receiving a report alleging neglect or
physical or sexual abuse of a child by a parent is required to
conduct an investigation. 56  Further, the welfare agency must
conduct an assessment and offer protective social services for
purposes of preventing further abuses, safeguarding and en-
hancing the welfare of the abused or neglected minor, and pre-
serving family life whenever possible.57
51. See Id. § 609.341, subd. 15(1) (1992). The following statutes prohibit certain
behavior when the actor has a significant relationship with the child: MINN. STAT.
§§ 609.342, subd. l(g),(h) (1992); 609.343, subd. l(g),(h) (1992); 609.344, subd.
l(f),(g) (1992 & Supp. 1993); 609.345, subd. l(f),(g) (1992 & Supp. 1993). Other rela-
tives by blood, marriage, or adoption, including brothers, sisters, grandparents, aunts,
and uncles, are also defined as having a significant relationship with the child. Thus,
these relatives are specifically proscribed from having sexual intercourse or contact with
the child. Id. § 609.341, subd. 15(2) (1992).
52. Id. § 626.556, subd. 2(b)(2) (1992 & Supp. 1993), subd. (3)(a) (1992). The
information must be reported to the local welfare agency, police department, or the
county sheriff. Id., subd. 3(a) (1992). This reporting law is not limited to neglect or
abuse which in fact has occurred in the past, but also mandates a report whenever there
is knowledge of or reasonable cause to believe a child is currently being neglected or
abused. Id.
53. Id., subd. 1.
54. See MINN. STAT. § 626.556, subd. 4(c) (1992). This statute also accords immu-
nity from civil liability to a voluntary or mandated reporter who makes a report. Id.,
subd. 4(a) (1992). Obviously, civil liability remains a possibility when a report is not
made. Reporters of child abuse are also protected from retaliation by their employers.
Id. Indeed, there is a "rebuttable presumption that any adverse action within 90 days of
a report is retaliatory." Id., subd. 4a(c) (1992).
55. Failure to report constitutes a misdemeanor. Id., subd. 6 (1992).
56. Id., subd. 10(a) (1992 & Supp. 1993).
57. Id.
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In carrying out the assessment, the local welfare agency has
the power to interview the victim without parental consent.
58
This interview may take place at the child's school, and school
officials are prohibited by law from disclosing to the child's par-
ents the fact that the interview took place.5 9 The welfare agency
also may interview other children who either formerly resided or
presently reside with the alleged perpetrator. 60  Again, the
school may not disclose the fact that the interviews took place.61
If the local welfare agency deems it necessary to immediately
take the child into custody, it may petition the court for emer-
gency relief.62 In the alternative, a police officer may take a
child into immediate custody when the officer reasonably be-
lieves the child's environment endangers his or her health or
welfare.63 When a child is taken into custody, the parent must
be notified as soon as possible64 and a hearing must be held
within seventy-two hours.
6 5
As an alternative to removing the child, the agency may peti-
tion the court to remove the abusive parent from the home.
66 If
the petition asserts reasonable grounds to believe the child faces
an immediate and present danger of abuse, the court may grant
an ex parte temporary order excluding the abusive parent from
the dwelling.
67
When the local welfare agency completes its assessment, two
determinations must be made. First, the agency must determine
if maltreatment has occurred. The welfare agency determines
whether maltreatment has occurred, after receiving a report
58. Id., subd. 10(c) (1992 & Supp. 1993). Interviews may be conducted without
parental consent in situations where someone other than the parent is the alleged per-
petrator. R.S. v. State, 459 N.W.2d 680, 689-90 (Minn. 1990). Further, interviews con-
ducted without parental consent, when the alleged perpetrator is unknown, do not
constitute an undue intrusion by the state into family relationships. Id. at 690. "The
interview-rightly implemented and conducted-is the fastest, most effective and least
intrusive means of assessing the validity of a report of abuse." Id.
59. MINN. STAT. § 626.556, subd. 10(c) (1992 & Supp. 1993).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. §§ 260.133, subd. 1 (1992); 260.135, subd. 5 (1992); see, e.g., In re Shady, 264
Minn. 222, 225, 118 N.W.2d 449, 451 (1963).
63. MINN. STAT. § 260.165, subd. 1(c) (2) (1992); see, e.g., In re Scott County Master
Docket, 672 F. Supp. 1152, 1199 (D. Minn. 1987), aff'd by Myers v. Scott County, 868
F.2d 1017 (8th Cir. 1989); In re Scalzo, 300 Minn. 548, 550, 220 N.W.2d 495,496 (1974).
64. MINN. STAT § 260.171, subd. 1 (1992).
65. Id. § 260.172, subd. l(a) (1992).
66. Id. § 260.133, subd. 2(2) (1992).
67. Id.
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which alleges abuse or neglect, by gathering facts, consulting
and interviewing, and assessing the level of risk.6" The definition
of maltreatment includes the physical and sexual abuse of the
child.69
Second, the agency must determine whether protective serv-
ices are needed.70 For the agency to make the determination, it
must have documented conditions "sufficient to cause a child
protection worker ... to conclude that the child is at significant
risk of maltreatment if protective intervention is not provided
and that the individuals responsible for the child's care have not
68. MINN. STAT. § 626.556 (1992 & Supp. 1993). The agency evaluates eleven fac-
tors to assess the level of risk. Those factors are:
(1) the child's age, physical and mental abilities: "generally the younger the
child the more vulnerable the child is to abuse,"
(2) the location, severity, recency and/or frequency of abuse,
(3) the severity and/or frequency of neglect, condition of the home: "be-
haviors that have appeared frequently in the past have a high chance of being
repeated in the future,"
(4) caretaker's age, physical, intellectual or emotional abilities/control: the
caretaker's disabilities which impede the ability to care for the child should be
considered,
(5) caretaker's level of cooperation: cooperation is defined as a willingness
to take action to protect the child,
(6) caretaker's parenting skills and/or knowledge,
(7) alleged perpetrator's access to the child: access is defined as alleged per-
petrator's ability to be close enough to the child to cause harm through pas-
sive or active means,
(8) presence of a parent substitute or other person in the home: a substitute
is defined as a person who is not legally responsible for parenting, for example
a boyfriend,
(9) previous history of abuse or neglect: regardless of whether the past vic-
tim is the same as the current victim,
(10) strength of family support systems: support systems are defined as indi-
viduals, professionals, etc. who can aide the caretaker, and
(11) stresses.
MINNESOTA DEP'T HUMAN SERVS., PROTECTIVE INTERVENTION ASSESSMENT: COMMENTARY
ON THE RISK ASSESSMENT FACTORS (1990) (interpreting MINN. R. 9560.0220, subp. 6(B)
(1991)).
69. MINN. STAT. § 626.556, subd. 10e(a) (1992 & Supp. 1993).
"Physical abuse" means any physical or mental injury, or threatened injury,
inflicted by a person responsible for the child's care on a child other than by
accidental means, or any physical or mental injury that cannot reasonably be
explained by the child's history of injuries, or any aversive and deprivation
procedures that have not been authorized under section 245.825.
Id., subd. 2(d) (Supp. 1993).
"Sexual abuse" means the subjection of a child by a person responsible for the
child's care, or by a person in a position of authority, as defined in section
609.341, subdivision 10, to any act which constitutes a violation of sections
609.342, 609.343, 609.344, or 609.345. Sexual abuse also includes any act
which involves a minor which constitutes a violation of sections 609.321 to
609.324 or section 617.246. Sexual abuse includes threatened sexual abuse.
Id., subd. 2(a) (1992 & Supp. 1993).
70. Id. § 626.556, subd. l0e (1992 & Supp. 1993).
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taken or are not likely to take actions to protect the child from
maltreatment or risk of maltreatment.
7 1
If the agency determines that a child faces imminent danger,
the agency must respond to the report as soon as it is received.72
Absent imminent danger, the agency must respond within one
working day or within seventy-two hours under certain condi-
tions. 73 A parent must be notified of the results of the maltreat-
ment determination within ten working days.
74
A family refusing services offered by the agency can be forced
to comply pursuant to Minnesota's Child in Need of Protection
or Services statute (CHIPS). 7 This statute provides that any
child who has been physically or sexually abused is in need of
protection or supervision.76 Any child who resides with a victim
of physical or sexual abuse or with a perpetrator of such abuse is
declared in need of protection or services.7 7 A CHIPS petition
alleging physical or sexual abuse must be placed at the top of the
court docket. 78 At the conclusion of the trial, the court must
make a decision within fifteen days.79 If the petition is proved by
clear and convincing evidence, this declaration entites the child
and the family to court ordered services."0
71. MINN. STAT. § 626.556, subd. 10e(b) (1992 & Supp. 1993).
72. MINN. R. 9560.0216, subp. 5(A)-(C) (1992).
73. Id. If the agency has no reason to believe the child will be in imminent danger
within the next 72 hours or if the agency has more critical reports to respond to first, it
may delay responding up to 72 hours. Id.
74. MINN. STAT. § 626.556, subd. 10(f) (1992 & Supp. 1993). The notice must in-
clude, in addition to the determination whether services are needed, the length of time
that the records will be kept before being destroyed or the right to have records de-
stroyed. Id.
75. Id. § 260.191 (1992 & Supp. 1993).
76. Id. § 260.015, subd. 2a (1992 & Supp. 1993).
77. Id., subd. 2a(2)(ii)-(iii) (1992 & Supp. 1993).
78. MINN. STAT. § 260.111, subd. 3 (1992). This urgency reflects the seriousness of
the problem as well as the Minnesota Legislature's policy of protecting children,
strengthening the community, and promoting responsible child care. Id. § 626.556,
subd. 1 (1992).
79. Id. §§ 546.27, subd. l(b) (1992); 260.155, subd. 1 (1992 & Supp. 1993).
This author has worked as a trial attorney in two CHIPS cases involving child abuse
in which the court waited 90 days after the adjudicatory hearing to render its decision.
As a result, services were delayed and, in each case, the child suffered further abuse.
The author contacted Minnesota State Senator Tracy Beckman and Representative Katy
Olson, who sponsored legislation limiting the trial court's time to file a decision in
these cases. The legislation eventually became part of the 1992 Omnibus Crime Bill and
is now codified as MINN. STAT. § 546.27, subd. l(b) (1992 & Supp. 1993) and MINN.
STAT. § 260.155, subd. 1 (1992 & Supp. 1993). See 1992 MINN. LAws ch. 571, art. 7, §§ 3,
11.
80. See MINN. STAT. § 260.191 (1992 & Supp. 1993).
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After finding that a child has been the victim of physical or
sexual abuse, the court may transfer custody to the local welfare
agency or place the child in his or her own home under the
protective supervision of the welfare agency and "under condi-
tions prescribed by the court directed to the correction of the
child's need for protection or services."81 If the child's physical
or mental health requires special care, the court may order the
parent to provide it.8 2 If the child is sixteen years of age or
older, the court may allow the child to live independently of his
or her parents.
83
The court's order may also include the following provisions:
(1) restrain the abusive parent from committing further acts of
abuse; (2) exclude the abusing parent from the family dwelling;
(3) establish a temporary visitation schedule for the abusive par-
ent with his or her children; (4) order the abusive parent to pay
child support and maintenance; (5) order counseling or other
social services for the family or household members; (6) require
the abusive parent to participate in treatment or counseling
services.84
If the court excludes an abusive parent from the family home,
the court must find that this exclusion serves the best interests of
the child(ren) remaining in the home, that a remaining adult
family member is able to care for the child(ren), and that the
local welfare agency has developed an appropriate plan for pro-
viding services to the remaining family or household members.8 5
C. Family Law
Minnesota's domestic relations code provides that if a parent
has been convicted of certain acts and if that parent seeks cus-
tody or even visitation with his or her child, then the parent
must prove that the contact would serve the best interests of the
child.86 If the victim was a family or household member, the
81. Id. § 260.191, subd. l(a)(1) (1992).
82. Id., subd. l(a)(3) (1992).
83. Id., subd. l(a)(4) (1992).
84. Id., subd. l(b) (1992).
85. MINN. STAT. § 260.191, subd. 1(b) (1992). An order to exclude an abusive par-
ent from the home, as is the case with all orders to remove children or restrain parents,
can only be valid for a specified length of time which cannot exceed one year, but the
order can be renewed by the court for another term. Id., subd. 2 (1992 & Supp. 1993).
86. MINN. STAT. § 518.179 (1992). This statute provides as follows:
Subdivision 1. Seeking custody or visitation. Notwithstanding any con-
trary provision in section 518.17 or 518.175, if a person seeking child custody
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parent must prove by clear and convincing evidence that custody
or visitation would serve the child's best interests. 87
To determine a child's best interests, Minnesota law requires
that the court consider all relevant factors, including:
(1) the wishes of the child's parent or parents as to
custody;
(2) the reasonable preference of the child, if the court
deems the child to be of sufficient age to express preference;
(3) the child's primary caretaker;
(4) the intimacy of the relationship between each parent
and the child;
(5) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with
a parent or parents, siblings, and any other person who may
significantly affect the child's best interests;
or visitation has been convicted of a crime described in subdivision 2, the per-
son seeking custody or visitation has the burden to prove that custody or visita-
tion by that person is in the best interests of the child if:
(1) the conviction occurred within the preceding five years;
(2) the person is currently incarcerated, on probation, or under super-
vised release for the offense; or
(3) the victim of the crime was a family or household member as defined
in section 518B.01, subdivision 2.
If this section applies, the court may not grant custody or visitation to the
person unless it finds that the custody or visitation is in the best interests of the
child. If the victim of the crime was a family or household member, the stan-
dard of proof is clear and convincing evidence.
Subd. 2. Applicable crimes. This section applies to the following crimes
or similar crimes under the laws of the United States, or any other state:
(1) murder in the first, second, or third degree under section 609.185,
609.19, or 609.195;
(2) manslaughter in the first degree under section 609.20;
(3) assault in the first, second, or third degree under section 609.221,
609.222, or 609.223;
(4) kidnapping under section 609.25;
(5) depriving another of custodial or parental rights under section
609.26;
(6) soliciting, inducing, or promoting prostitution involving a minor
under section 609.322;
(7) receiving profit from prostitution involving a minor under section
609.323;
(8) criminal sexual conduct in the first degree under section 609.342;
(9) criminal sexual conduct in the second degree under section
609.343;
(10) criminal sexual conduct in the third degree under section 609.344,
subdivision 1, paragraph (c),(f), or (g);
(11) solicitation of a child to engage in sexual conduct under section
609.352;
(12) incest under section 609.365;
(13) malicious punishment of a child under section 609.377; or
(14) neglect of a child under section 609.378.
Id.
87. Id., subd. 1 (1992).
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(6) the child's adjustment to home, school, and
community;
(7) the length of time the child has lived in a stable, satis-
factory environment and the desirability of maintaining
continuity;
(8) the permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or
proposed custodial home;
(9) the mental and physical health of all individuals
involved;
(10) the capacity and disposition of the parties to give the
child love, affection, and guidance, and to continue educat-
ing and raising the child in the child's culture and religion or
creed, if any;
(11) the child's cultural background; and
(12) the effect on the child of the actions of an abuser, if
related to domestic abuse ... that has occurred between the
parents.88
Although the court may not use one factor to the exclusion of
the others,8 9 it is clear that courts disfavor granting custody to
abusive parents.9° The Minnesota Supreme Court has held that
an order awarding custody to a father who has sexually molested
his eight- and ten-year-old daughters constituted an abuse of dis-
88. MINN. STAT. § 518.17, subd. 1(1)-(12) (1992).
89. Id., subd. la (1992); see Rosenfeld v. Rosenfeld, 311 Minn. 76, 82-83, 249
N.W.2d 168, 171-72 (Minn. 1976) (requiring that trial court's findings reflect its consid-
eration of all statutory factors in determining a child's best interests); Nazar v. Nazar,
505 N.W.2d 628, 633 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993), review denied, (Minn. Oct. 28, 1993) (stat-
ing that the trial court must consider all statutory factors pertaining to the best interests
of children but need not make a specific finding on each factor) (citing Schultz v.
Schultz, 358 N.W.2d 136, 138 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984)); see also Abbott v. Abbott, 481
N.W.2d 864, 867 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that specific findings of fact must be
made on statutory factors relevant in any particular custody modification case).
90. See Simonson v. Simonson, 292 N.W.2d 12, 13 (Minn. 1980) (finding an abuse
of discretion where custody of minor was awarded to mother who was cohabiting with a
man who had a record of sexually molesting children); In re T.B., 299 Minn. 218, 219,
218 N.W.2d 757, 758 (Minn. 1974) (holding that an order which allowed the father to
retain custody was an abuse of discretion where the juvenile court found that the father
had sexually molested his daughters); Nazar, 505 N.W.2d at 633 (finding that the trial
court "must seriously examine any allegations of child abuse before determining cus-
tody"); Uhl v. Uhl, 395 N.W.2d 106, 111 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that the trial
court erred in neglecting to carefully examine allegations of physical abuse prior to
making a custody determination); cf. Surrett v. Surrett, 396 N.W.2d 870, 873-74 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1986), review denied, (Minn. Jan. 16, 1987) (affirming custody award where
mother was living out of wedlock with man convicted of forgery, uttering, and indecent
exposure since examining psychologists did not find that he posed any kind of threat to
the physical or emotional health of the child).
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cretion.9 1 According to the court, "[t]he gravity of the offenses
disqualifies him as a custodial parent, and the retention of the
custodial relationship ... would not remove the emotional scars
upon the children."92 The supreme court remanded the case
for the trial court to consider whether the father had been reha-
bilitated, but noted that the father had apparently not acknowl-
edged his offenses and that such acknowledgment "must
precede reformation. '" 9'
In Simonson v. Simonson,94 the Minnesota Supreme Court ruled
that it was an abuse of discretion to award custody of a three-
year-old boy to an otherwise fit mother when the mother was
living with a man who had been convicted of two sexual offenses
involving girls and who had also been accused of other sexual
improprieties.95 The court stated that it was "clearly" not in the
child's best interests to live in the same home with a convicted
child abuser.96 The court awarded custody to the father "until
and unless the trial court finds the [mother] has terminated her
relationship" with the child abuser. 97 The court further prohib-
ited the mother from visitation with her child when she was in
the company of the abusive boyfriend. 98
In Uhl v. Uhl,99 the Minnesota Court of Appeals remanded a
trial court's award of custody to a mother when allegations of
physical abuse had not been fully examined.100 Upon rehearing,
the appellate court affirmed the award of custody to the mother
when the acts of abuse were not egregious, not repetitive, re-
flected the mother's culture, and occurred when the mother was
under a great deal of stress. 10 1 Moreover, the mother was under-
going therapy, and her therapist maintained that she had dis-
continued the use of physical punishment.'0 2 If the physical
punishment had been serious, repetitive, or if the mother had
91. In re T.B., 299 Minn. at 219, 218 N.W.2d at 757-58.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. 292 N.W.2d 12 (Minn. 1980).
95. Id. at 13.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. 413 N.W.2d 213 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
100. Id. at 215.
101. Id. The mother spanked one of her children with a wooden spoon and slapped
the child's mouth. Id, at 214.
102. Id. at 216.
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failed to address the conduct, an award of custody would pre-
sumably have been an abuse of discretion. 0 3
Rather than wait for dissolution or custody proceedings, any
family household member can seek an order for protection on
behalf of a minor victim of physical or sexual abuse. a 4 If neces-
sary to protect the children, the court may deny a parent's right
to visitation entirely.10 5 The court is required to give "primary
consideration" to the safety of the children.1"6 A violation of the
order for protection constitutes a misdemeanor.'0 7 A second vi-
olation within two years of the previous violation constitutes a
gross misdemeanor requiring an executed sentence of at least
ten days in jail.' An order for protection may be valid for one
year unless the court finds that a longer period would be
appropriate. 0 9
IV. CHILD ABUSE AND MINNESOTA'S TERMINATION OF PARENTAL
RIGHTS STATUTE
In Minnesota, there are eight grounds upon which parental
rights may be involuntarily terminated.110 A court need find the
103. The court was persuaded by the report of the child protection investigator who
investigated the two 1985 reported incidents of abuse and concluded they were not
serious. Id. Presumably, then, a report of serious abuse may have altered the court's
decision.
104. MINN. STAT. § 518B.01, subd. 2(b), subd. 4(a) (1992); see, e.g., Kimmel v. Kim-
mel, 392 N.W.2d 904, 907 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
105. MINN. STAT. § 518B.01, subd. 6(3) (1992 & Supp. 1993).
106. Id.; see Hall v. Hall, 408 N.W.2d 626, 629 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987), review denied,
(Minn. Aug. 19, 1987) (affirming protective order which restricted husband to super-
vised visitation even though wife only alleged acts of domestic abuse directed at herself
and not at the children); Kimme4 392 N.W.2d at 908 (finding that trial court did not
abuse its discretion in acting quickly to protect the child when faced with an emergency
situation which jeopardized the child's health, safety, and welfare even though the
court did not strictly adhere to the statutory requirements of domestic abuse act).
107. MINN. STAT. § 518B.01, subd. 14(a) (1992 & Supp. 1993); Swenson v. Swenson,
490 N.W.2d 668, 670-71 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992); see also State v. Andrasko, 454 N.W.2d
648, 650 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that violation of a protective order was punish-
able under the statute even though the order was voided after it had been violated).
108. MINN. STAT. § 518B.01, subd. 14(a) (1992 & Supp. 1993).
109. Id., subd. 6(b) (1992 & Supp. 1993).
110. MINN. STAT. § 260.221, subd. 1(b) (1992 & Supp. 1993). The eight grounds for
involuntary termination are as follows:
(1) That the parent has abandoned the child. Abandonment is pre-
sumed when:
(i) the parent has had no contact with the child on a regular basis and no
demonstrated, consistent interest in the child's well-being for six months; and
(ii) the social service agency has made reasonable efforts to facilitate con-
tact, unless the parent establishes that an extreme financial or physical hard-
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ship or treatment for mental disability or chemical dependency or other good
cause prevented the parent from making contact with the child. This pre-
sumption does not apply to children whose custody has been determined
under chapter 257 or 518. The court is not prohibited from finding abandon-
ment in the absence of this presumption; or
(2) That the parent has substantially, continuously, or repeatedly refused
or neglected to comply with the duties imposed upon that parent by the par-
ent and child relationship, including but not limited to providing the child
with necessary food, clothing, shelter, education, and other care and control
necessary for the child's physical, mental, or emotional health and develop-
ment, if the parent is physically and financially able, and reasonable efforts by
the social service agency have failed to correct the conditions that formed the
basis of the petition; or
(3) That a parent has been ordered to contribute to the support of the
child or financially aid in the child's birth and has continuously failed to do so
without good cause. This clause shall not be construed to state a grounds for
termination of parental rights of a non custodial parent if that parent has not
been ordered to or cannot financially contribute to the support of the child or
aid in the child's birth; or
(4) That a parent is palpably unfit to be a party to the parent and child
relationship because of a consistent pattern of specific conduct before the
child or of specific conditions directly relating to the parent and child rela-
tionship either of which are determined by the court to be of a duration or
nature that renders the parent unable, for the reasonably foreseeable future,
to care appropriately for the ongoing physical, mental, or emotional needs of
the child. It is presumed that a parent is palpably unfit to be a party to the
parent and child relationship upon a showing that:
(i) the child was adjudicated in need of protection or services due to cir-
cumstances described in section 260.015, subdivision 2a, clause (1), (2), (3),
(5), or (8); and
(ii) within the three-year period immediately prior to that adjudication,
the parent's parental rights to one or more other children were involuntarily
terminated under clause (1), (2), (4), or (7) of this paragraph, or under
clause (5) of this paragraph if the child was initially determined to be in need
of protection or services due to circumstances described in section 260.015,
subdivision 2a, clause (1), (2), (3), (5), or (8); or
(5) That following upon a determination of neglect or dependency, or of
a child's need for protection or services, reasonable efforts, under the direc-
tion of the court, have failed to correct the conditions leading to the determi-
nation. It is presumed that reasonable efforts under this clause have failed
upon a showing that:
(i) a child under the age of 12 has resided out of the parental home
under court order for more than one year following an adjudication of depen-
dency, neglect, need for protection or services under section 260.015, subdivi-
sion 2a, clause (1), (2), (6), (8), or (9), or neglected and in foster care, and an
order for disposition under section 260.191, including adoption of the case
plan required by section 257.071;
(ii) conditions leading to the determination will not be corrected within
the reasonably foreseeable future; and
(iii) reasonable efforts have been made by the social service agency to
rehabilitate the parent and reunite the family.
This clause does not prohibit the termination of parental rights prior to
one year after a child has been placed out of the home.
It is also presumed that reasonable efforts have failed under this clause
upon a showing that:
(i) the parent has been diagnosed as chemically dependent by a profes-
sional certified to make the diagnosis;
(ii) the parent has been required by a case plan to participate in a chemi-
cal dependency treatment program
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existence of only one of the statutory grounds in order to termi-
nate parental rights."' 1 However, termination statutes are in der-
ogation of the common law and must be strictly construed in
favor of the parental relationship. 1 2 Parental rights will be
taken away only for "grave and weighty" reasons.1 3 The law
presumes that a natural parent is fit and suitable to be entrusted
with the care of a child. 4 In any termination proceeding, the
best interests of the child are the paramount consideration. 5
However, the best interests of the child are a factor only if one of
the statutory grounds for termination has been proved." 6 More-
(iii) the treatment programs offered to the parent were culturally, lin-
guistically, and clinically appropriate
(iv) the parent has either failed two or more times to successfully com-
plete a treatment program or has refused at two or more separate meetings
with a caseworker to participate in a treatment program; and
(v) the parent continues to abuse chemicals.
Provided, that this presumption applies only to parents required by a case
plan to participate in a chemical dependency treatment program on or after
July 1, 1990; or
(6) That the parent has been convicted of causing the death of another
of the parent's children; or
(7) That in the case of a child born to a mother who was not married to
the child's father when the child was conceived nor when the child was born
the person is not entitled to notice of an adoption hearing under section
259.26 and either the person has not filed a notice of intent to retain parental
rights under section 259.261 or that the notice has been successfully chal-
lenged; or
(8) That the child is neglected and in foster care.
Id.
111. In reC.K., 426 N.W.2d 842, 847 (Minn. 1988); In rePJ.K., 369 N.W.2d 286, 290
(Minn. 1985); In re R.M.M. III, 316 N.W.2d 538, 541 (Minn. 1982); In reJ.S., 470 N.W.2d
697, 701 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991), review denied, (Minn. July 24, 1991); In re D.F.B., 412
N.W.2d 406, 410 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987), review denied, (Minn. Nov. 18, 1987); In re M.A.,
408 N.W.2d 227, 232 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987), review denied, (Minn. Sept. 18, 1987); In re
A.K.K., 356 N.W.2d 337, 343 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
112. In re A.K.K., 356 N.W.2d at 340. (citing In re Parks, 267 Minn. 468, 474, 127
N.W.2d 548, 553 (1964)).
113. In re M.D.O., 462 N.W.2d 370, 375 (Minn. 1990) (citing In re H.G.B., 306
N.W.2d 821, 825 (Minn. 1981)); In re KT., 327 N.W.2d 13, 18 (Minn. 1982).
114. In re C.K., 426 N.W.2d at 847 (citing In re Clausen, 289 N.W.2d 153, 155 (Minn.
1980)); In re Chosa, 290 N.W.2d 766, 769 (Minn. 1980); In rejS., 470 N.W.2d at 701
(citing In reA.H., 402 N.W.2d 598, 602 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987)); In reJ.H.D., 416 N.W.2d
194, 197 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987), review denied, (Minn. Feb. 12, 1988); In re A.KK, 356
N.W.2d at 340.
115. MINN. STAT. § 260.221, subd. 4 (1992 & Supp. 1993); In re M.D.O., 462 N.W.2d
at 375 (citing In reJ.W., 391 N.W.2d 791, 794-95 (Minn. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
1040 (1987)); In reJ.J.B., 390 N.W.2d 274, 279 (Minn. 1986); In rejS., 470 N.W.2d at
701.
116. MINN. STAT. § 260.221, subd. 4 (1992 & Supp. 1993). The best interests of a
child was not a compelling factor in parental rights termination proceedings until fairly
recently. See In re Linehan, 280 N.W.2d 29, 31 (Minn. 1979) (rejecting a child's best
interests as a compelling factor in parental rights termination proceeding).
[Vol. 20
20
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 3 [1994], Art. 4
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol20/iss3/4
TERMINATING PARENTAL RIGHTS
over, the petitioner must prove that the conditions necessitating
termination will continue for a prolonged, indeterminate period
of time.117
Of the eight statutory grounds for termination of parental
rights, five may be used in cases of child abuse. Parental abuse
of a child may warrant termination if the conduct constitutes a
repeated failure to comply with parental duties, makes the
abuser palpably unfit to parent, or leaves the child neglected
and in foster care.' Parental rights may also be terminated
when the abuse is followed by failed but reasonable efforts at
reunification or when the abuse results in death of one of the
parent's children." 9
Four of these statutory grounds require proof of more than
mere abuse. As a result, Minnesota parents may physically and
sexually molest their children without risk of losing their paren-
tal rights as long as the abuse is not repeated, the parent ac-
knowledges the need for help, and a child has not died.
Additionally, parents may physically and sexually molest their
children until efforts at reunification have failed, a process
which often continues for years.
A. Repeated Failure to Comply With Parental Duties
The repeated neglect of a parental duty is one statutory
ground for termination of parental rights.1 2 0 Specifically, the
statute provides for termination when:
Subsequent legislative changes made it clear that courts should balance the inter-
ests of both parents and children in determining whether to continue or terminate
parental rights. See In re JJB., 390 N.W.2d at 279; see also, In re C.K., 426 N.W.2d at 847;
In reP.J.K, 369 N.W.2d 286, 292 (Minn. 1985); In re H.G.B., 306 N.W.2d at 826-27; In re
R.T.B., 492 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992); In rejS., 470 N.W.2d at 701 (citing In re
J.J.B., 390 N.W.2d at 279).
117. In re M.D.O., 462 N.W.2d at 377 (citing In re R.M.M., 316 N.W.2d 538, 542
(Minn. 1982)); In re Chosa, 290 N.W.2d at 769; In rejH.D., 416 N.W.2d at 197; In re
N.C.K., 411 N.W.2d 577, 580 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); In reJ.K., 374 N.W.2d 463, 466-67
(Minn. Ct. App. 1985); In re A.KK., 356 N.W.2d at 341.
118. See infra part IV.A-C.
119. See infra art IV.D, E.
120. Termination of parental rights has been upheld on the basis of neglect of pa-
rental duties in a variety of situations. See In reKidd, 261 N.W.2d 833, 836 (Minn. 1978)
(finding that behavior stemming from a mental condition was "other conduct" likely to
be detrimental to the health and welfare of the child); In reA.H., 402 N.W.2d 598, 603
(Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (terminating parental rights on grounds of neglect of parental
duties where a parent suffered from mental illness); see also In re R.M.M., 316 N.W.2d at
541 (supporting termination of parental rights where the parent suffered from alcohol
abuse and where the child's emotional and physical health would be jeopardized); In re
1994]
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The parent has substantially, continuously, or repeatedly re-
fused or neglected to comply with the duties imposed upon
that parent by the parent and child relationship, including
but not limited to providing the child with necessary food,
clothing, shelter, education, and other care and control nec-
essary for the child's physical, mental, or emotional health
and development, if the parent is physically and financially
able, and reasonable efforts by the social service agency have
failed to correct the conditions that formed the basis of the
petition.
12 1
Although child abuse breaches the parental duty to provide
for the safety of children, this statutory provision requires much
more than proof of child abuse. Consequently, an act of physi-
cal or sexual abuse, no matter how egregious, does not warrant
termination because the statute requires the parent to repeat-
edly or continuously neglect to comply with a parental duty.
122
Individual acts of child abuse do not generally fit the definition
of "repeated" or "continuous."
Although not repeated or continuous, a single, extreme act of
child abuse may constitute a "substantial" neglect of a parental
duty. For example, beating a child to the point of death obvi-
ously constitutes a substantial neglect of the parental duty to pro-
vide for the child's health and welfare. However, the statute
requires the local welfare agency to make reasonable efforts at
reunification prior to seeking termination. 12 3 In other words,
the local welfare agency must work toward the goal of placing
the child with his or her abuser prior to any consideration of
severing the relationship. This means that the presumption that
a parent is a fit and suitable caretaker 124 operates to give the
abusive parent another chance to harm the child victim.
Even if the abusive parent reoffends during reunification ef-
forts, the local welfare agency must prove that the abusive con-
duct will continue "for a prolonged, indeterminate period in
order to terminate the abusive parent's rights.' 1 25 The existence
Staat, 287 Minn. 501, 506, 178 N.W.2d 709, 713 (1970) (terminating parental rights
based on neglect of parental duties where abandonment was found).
121. MINN. STAT. § 260.221, subd. l(b)(2) (1992 & Supp. 1993).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. In re Chosa, 290 N.W.2d 766, 769 (Minn. 1980).
125. In re KM.M., 316 N.W.2d at 542; In re Chosa, 290 N.W.2d at 769; In reJ.H.D.,
416 N.W.2d 194, 197 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
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of a neglect or CHIPS determination is not enough to warrant
termination.
12 6
In the case of In rejH.D.,127 the court found that abusive and
neglectful conduct constituted a breach of parental duties and
warranted termination of the parent's rights. 12 8 The abuse
included cigarette burns and repeatedly tying one of three chil-
dren to the bed by his ankle.12 9 There were additional unex-
plained injuries and, on one occasion, the children witnessed
their father shoot their mother and the mother's boyfriend.
130
If the court in J.H.D. had not found that this pattern of abuse
and neglect would continue for a prolonged, indeterminate pe-
riod of time, termination would not have been warranted. If the
local welfare agency had not made reasonable efforts at reunifi-
cation, termination would also have been inappropriate.
In J.H.D., the determination that the abuse would continue
for a prolonged, indeterminate period of time, and that reason-
able efforts at reunification would fail, involved experimenting
with the lives of three children. The court allowed the children
to live with one or both parents for nearly two years after the
children were determined to be neglected, with the exception of
a one-month period when the children were placed in foster
care. 13 As a result, the children lived in a house "which reeked
of urine" and had dog feces on the floor. 132 When the children
lived briefly with their mother, they had no beds and slept on
the floor.1 33 There was an inadequate supply of diapers and the
children were not dressed properly for the weather.1
34
When the children lived with their father, the dishes were
cleaner and there was more food, but "the house was still filthy
and reeked of urine."1 3 5 At one point, a "pile of laundry in the
basement appeared to be growing 'mold.' 1136 When the chil-
dren were placed in foster care in September of 1985, reunifica-
tion efforts presumably continued until May of 1986 when a
126. In reJ.H.D., 416 N.W.2d at 197.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 200.
129. Id. at 196.
130. Id. at 196-197.
131. In rejH.D., 416 N.W.2d at 195-96.
132. Id. at 196.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. In rejH.D., 416 N.W.2d at 197.
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petition to terminate parental rights was filed.'37 By that time,
the father had already been in prison for four months for shoot-
ing his wife. 3 ' The TPR trial did not occur until October
1986.139 The court of appeals order upholding the decision to
terminate parental rights is dated December 8, 1987.140 A final
order denying further review is dated February 12, 1988, five
years after the trial court first determined that the children were
neglected. 141
In an effort to keep the children with their parents, the local
welfare agency provided nutrition lectures, home management
and hygiene information, parenting classes, visits two times per
week by a public health nurse, and counseling.'42 The parents
signed service contracts but failed to abide by them.'43 Although
the financial cost of these efforts is substantial, it pales in com-
parison to the emotional cost that necessarily accompanied the
continuing neglect endured by these children.
B. Palpable Unfitness to Parent
Palpable unfitness to parent is a ground for termination of
parental rights.' 44 Specifically, the statute allows for termination
when:
[A] parent is palpably unfit to be a party to the parent and
child relationship because of a consistent pattern of specific
conduct before the child or of specific conditions directly re-
lating to the parent and child relationship either of which are
determined by the court to be of a duration or nature that
renders the parent unable, for the reasonably foreseeable fu-
137. Id.
138. Id. at 196-197.
139. Id. at 197.
140. Id. at 194.
141. In reJ.H.D., 416 N.W.2d at 194.
142. Id. at 198.
143. Id. at 198-99.
144. See In reMartinson, 287 Minn. 213, 215-16, 177 N.W.2d 808, 809-10 (1970) (ter-
minating parental rights based on palpable unfitness to parent where the mother ex-
pressed little interest in the child and had made no serious attempt to provide home for
child); In re E.L.H., 356 N.W.2d 795, 797 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (finding termination
appropriate on grounds of palpable unfitness to parent where the parent had an ongo-
ing chemical dependency problem, had never established a home suitable for the child,
and had never helped support the child); see also In rejH.D., 416 N.W.2d at 194; cf In re
Solomon, 291 N.W.2d 364, 368 (Minn. 1980) (holding that sporadic or infrequent visi-
tation alone is not sufficient to warrant termination of parental rights on grounds of
palpable unfitness to parent).
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ture, to care appropriately for the ongoing physical, mental,
or emotional needs of the child.' 45
Child abuse has been a basis for determining a parent to be
palpably unfit.14 6 Irrespective of its severity, however, child
abuse alone does not warrant termination of parental rights.
This is because the abuse must be "of a duration or nature that
renders the parent unable, for the reasonably foreseeable future' to
care for the victim.
47
In the case In re B.C.,'48 a mother who killed her six week old
infant daughter was determined to be palpably unfit to parent
one of her three remaining children.'49 The infant's death was
the result of "massive" skull fractures "of a size the examining
doctor had never before seen in such a small baby-fractures
which had to be accomplished with substantial force, fractures
consistent with the impact of the skull on the floor or wall."
150
The presence of scar tissue on the brain indicated that the child
had been abused on multiple occasions. 151 In explaining the
murder to a police officer, the mother said, "[t] he baby is lucky,
she doesn't have to grow up in this world. People hurt people
they love, she is better off in the hands of the Lord.' 152  The
mother was deemed to be "psychologically disturbed" and to suf-
145. MINN. STAT. § 260.221, subd. l(b)(4) (1992 & Supp. 1993). The statute further
provides:
It is presumed that a parent is palpably unfit to be a party to the parent
and child relationship upon a showing that:
(i) the child was adjudicated in need of protection or services due to cir-
cumstances described in section 260.015, subdivision 2a, clause (1), (2), (3),
(5), or (8); and
(ii) within the three-year period immediately prior to that adjudication,
the parent's parental rights to one or more other children were involuntarily
terminated under clause (1), (2), (4), or (7) of this paragraph, or under
clause (5) of this paragraph if the child was initially determined to be in need
of protection or services due to circumstances described in section 260.015,
subdivision 2a, clause (1), (2), (3), (5), or (8).
Id.
146. See In re Suchy, 281 N.W.2d 723 (Minn. 1979); In re N.C.K., 411 N.W.2d 577
(Minn. Ct. App. 1987); In reM.A., 408 N.W.2d 227 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); In re L.M.M.,
372 N.W.2d 431 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985); In re Maas, 355 N.W.2d 480 (Minn. Ct. App.
1984); In re Udstuen, 349 N.W.2d 300 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984). See also infra notes 148-72
and accompanying text.
147. MINN. STAT. § 260.221, subd. l(b)(4) (1992 & Supp. 1993) (emphasis added).
148. 256 N.W.2d 328 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
149. Id. at 330. The appellate court also upheld termination on the ground the
child was neglected and in foster care. Id.
150. Id. at 331.
151. Id.
152. Id.
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fer from "delusional thinking. 1 5'  The mother was sentenced to
prison as a result of the killing and had four years left to serve at
the time the court of appeals upheld the trial court's decision to
terminate the mother's parental rights.' 54
Although the court of appeals found the mother palpably un-
fit to parent her four year old boy, B.C., the court noted the
mother's imprisonment for savagely beating her infant, by itself,
did not warrant a finding of palpable unfitness to parent. 55 The
court correctly found that the TPR statute, as written, requires
"other evidence" such as the parent's lack of interest in her sur-
viving children. 56 According to the court, "[t]he statute clearly
requires proof of specific conditions over a period of time which
are permanently detrimental to the child."
t57
In this case, the mother's beating of the infant makes her unfit
to parent only when combined with her imprisonment and her
refusal to recognize her parental shortcomings.'5 8 Indeed, the
appellate court found "most important to the characterization of
appellant as palpably unfit is her conviction that she is indeed a
good parent. 159
As a result of requiring more than egregious physical abuse to
prove a parent palpably unfit, the child B.C.remained in foster
care for at least two years and endured emotionally harmful visits
153. In re B.C., 356 N.w.2d at 331.
154. Id. at 330.
155. Id. at 331.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 332.
158. In re B.C., 356 N.W.2d at 331. Another case that represents the need for more
than abuse or threatened abuse in order to terminate parental rights under the statute
is In reN.C.K., 411 N.W.2d 577 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987). In N.C.K., the mother had been
committed to the State Security Hospital in Saint Peter for five months when she had
twin boys. Id. at 579. The mother was mentally retarded (her I.Q. was 69), and she was
diagnosed with several other psychological disorders including unpredictable mood sw-
ings and violent outbursts of temper. Id. She threatened to kill her unborn children
during one outburst and had assaulted several children because she said "they irritated"
her. Id. Two psychologists testified that the mother would never be able to care for the
twins. Id. The court rejected the mother's request that termination of her parental
rights be delayed because the record clearly showed that the mother would never be
able to parent her children and it was in their best interests to have her parental rights
terminated so they could be adopted. Id. at 580-81.
In a separate case, a father's savage beating of his son justified termination on the
basis that the child was neglected and in foster care. In re Udstuen, 349 N.W.2d 300
(Minn. Ct. App. 1984). Apparently, no effort was made to declare the father palpably
unfit. See infra notes 179-90 and accompanying text.
159. In re B.C., 356 N.W.2d at 332.
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with his imprisoned mother. 6 ' After visiting with his mother,
the child resorted to "hitting, kicking and biting others.""'1 The
effects of these visits were deemed "permanently detrimental" to
the child's "mental health and emotional development." '62
In another case, In re M.A., 63 a finding that the father was
palpably unfit to parent was based on evidence that he had phys-
ically and sexually abused his children. The appellate court ex-
pressed the "greatest concern" over the lower court's finding of
parental unfitness "where there has been no contact between
parent and child for over three years . . . ."" However, there
was evidence that the father's violent propensity was ongoing.
For example, the father threatened to kill a social worker and
brought bullets and razor blades to his termination hearing.
165
Although the termination decision was upheld, the final deci-
sion came approximately five years after the father's two chil-
dren were placed in foster care as dependent children.'6 6 In
addition to waiting at least five years for permanency planning,
the child M.A. endured further abuse. Approximately three
months after her placement in foster care, the child was sexually
abused by her father in the building of the local welfare agency.
167
While accompanying the child to the bathroom, the father in-
serted his finger into the child's vagina.
6 8
160. Id. at 330, 332.
161. Id. at 330.
162. Id. at 332.
163. 408 N.W.2d 227 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
164. Id. at 232.
165. Id. The court also terminated the mother's parental rights on grounds of pal-
pable unfitness. Id. at 232-33. However, the court again expressed reluctance in doing
so when the mother's contact with the children was limited. Id. Nonetheless, the
mother initially abused the children and there was "guarded reason" to expect improve-
ment in her overall ability to parent. Id. at 235. The court also expressed concern
about the mother's marriage to a convicted and untreated sex offender. However, the
court found the sexual abuse was "inadequately evaluated" and "marriage to one who
has been guilty of misconduct does not per se establish unfitness..." Id.
In another case a court found palpable unfitness, partly because of a parent's asso-
ciation with a child abuser. In re Maas, 355 N.W.2d 480 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984). In
Maas, a mother's continued defense of her boyfriend's physical abuse of her child was
one factor to be considered in deeming the mother palpably unfit. Id. at 483.
166. In re M.A., 408 N.W.2d at 229.
167. Id. at 232.
168. Id.
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Another case where the court considered terminating paren-
tal rights based on palpable unfitness is In re M.D.O.169 In that
case the court held that a parent's conviction for murdering her
own adopted daughter was an insufficient basis to find her pal-
pably unfit to parent a subsequent child who was born while she
was awaiting trial. 17' The court noted that it is onerous to prove
that parental rights should be terminated17 1 and concluded that
in this case there was no "consistent pattern of conduct" or "spe-
cific conditions" which were permanently detrimental to the wel-
fare of M.D.O.
172
In Minnesota, abused children do not receive the benefit of a
presumption favoring the termination of their abusers' parental
rights. For these children, the burden of proving palpable unfit-
ness or detrimental parental conduct continues to be onerous.
As a result, these children face the prospect of years of foster
care during which ongoing contact with their abusive parents
may emotionally and physically harm them.
C. Neglected and in Foster Care
A child's status as "neglected and in foster care" is also a statu-
tory ground for termination of parental rights.171 In determin-
ing whether a child is neglected and in foster care, the court
must consider at least seven factors. These factors include:
(1) the length of time the child has been in foster care;
(2) the effort the parent has made to adjust circumstances,
conduct, or condition that necessitates the removal of the
child to make it in the child's best interest to be returned to
the parent's home in the foreseeable future, including the
use of rehabilitative services offered to the parent;
(3) whether the parent has visited the child within the
three months preceding the filing of the petition, unless ex-
treme financial or physical hardship or treatment for mental
disability or chemical dependency or other good cause pre-
vented the parent from visiting the child or it was not in the
best interests of the child to be visited by the parent;
169. 462 N.W.2d 370 (Minn. 1990). See also infra notes 203-26 and accompanying
text.
170. In re M.D.O., 462 N.W.2d at 378.
171. Id. at 376.
172. Id. at 377.
173. MINN. STAT. § 260.221, subd. I(b) (8) (1992); see In re P.J.K., 369 N.W.2d 286
(Minn. 1985); In re D.F.B., 412 N.W.2d 406 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); In reJJ.L.B., 394
N.W.2d 858 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); In reJ.A., 377 N.W.2d 69 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
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(4) the maintenance of regular contact or communication
with the agency or person temporarily responsible for the
child;
(5) the appropriateness and adequacy of services provided
or offered to the parent to facilitate a reunion;
(6) whether additional services would be likely to bring
about lasting parental adjustment enabling a return of the
child to the parent within an ascertainable period of time,
whether the services have been offered to the parent, or, if
services were not offered, the reasons they were not offered;
and
(7) the nature of the efforts made by the responsible social
service agency to rehabilitate and reunite the family, and
whether the efforts were reasonable.
1 74
The statutory framework again urges the county to look to-
ward reunification before the parent-child relationship is perma-
nently severed. 175 In cases of abuse, this means that the child
must have ongoing contact with the abuser or remain idle in
foster care until sufficient time has passed that the child can be
deemed "neglected and in foster care."
171
For example, a father's imprisonment for first degree as-
sault 77 has previously formed the basis for a finding that the
child was neglected and in foster care.' 71 In the case In re Ud-
174. MINN. STAT. § 260.155, subd. 7 (1992).
175. Id.; see, e.g., In reJ.J.L.B., 394 N.W.2d at 862-63 (upholding termination after the
parent refused to use most of the rehabilitation services offered to her, failed to keep in
contact with social services, and after social service professionals concluded that addi-
tional services would probably not result in parental adjustment which would facilitate
return of the children to the parent); In rejA., 377 N.W.2d at 73 (finding that termina-
tion of parental rights on grounds of the child's status as neglected and in foster care
was correct where, despite reasonable social service efforts, the parent failed to correct
conditions of neglect and the prognosis for correction of such conditions was poor); see
also In re S.N., 423 N.W.2d 83, 89-90 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (concluding that it was
inappropriate to terminate parental rights where no formal reunification program had
been developed and where it could not be said that reunification efforts would be
unsuccessful).
176. See, e.g., In reB.C., 356 N.W.2d 328, 332 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (noting that the
son of a convicted child murderer was placed in foster care for two years and the boy's
progress was "sprinkled with setbacks-noticeable, alarming setbacks following visits"
with his imprisoned mother). See also supra notes 148-62 and accompanying text (ana-
lyzing In re B.C.).
177. First degree assault is an assault resulting in "great bodily harm". MINN. STAT.
§ 609.221 (1992). Great bodily harm means "bodily injury which creates a high
probability of death, or which causes serious permanent disfigurement, or which causes
a permanent or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or
organ or other serious bodily harm." Id. § 609.02, subd. 8 (1992).
178. In re Udstuen, 349 N.W.2d 300 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
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stuen,17 9 a father held his three-month-old son under water and
ran a comb over the child's hand with such force that the child
received linear cuts. 80 In addition, the child suffered rib and
skull fractures, subdural and retinal hemorrhaging. 1" Although
the hemorrhaging was the result of recent trauma,18 2 the frac-
tures were in the process of healing, 1 3 suggesting a pattern of
abuse. Even years after the abuse, the child was still "unable to
walk, crawl, hold things in his hands, or feed himself."18 4
Incredibly, the father's conduct in Udstuen, standing alone,
did not justify termination of his parental rights. Instead, the
trial court and appellate court found it necessary to apply the
seven factors listed in section 260.155, subdivision 7 of the Min-
nesota Statutes. 8 5 Moreover, the court again recognized the pe-
titioner's obligation to show that the conditions existing at the
time of the hearing would continue for a prolonged, indetermi-
nate period of time. 8 6 Because the father expressed a lack of
interest in his son, and because the child suffered extraordinary
physical and emotional harm as a result of the beating, termina-
tion was warranted.
1 87
Up to the time of the TPR trial, the child had lived in a hospi-
tal or foster care for all but six weeks of the first twenty-two
months of his life. 8 By the time of the court of appeals deci-
sion, the child was nearly three years old. 8 The appeals court
noted that the child's aging would lessen his adoptability and
that he needed a "permanent family relationship as soon as pos-
sible.""' If the statutory scheme did not require proof that the
child's neglect would continue indefinitely, the TPR petition
probably could have been filed earlier and a "permanent family
relationship" developed more quickly.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 302.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 301.
183. In re Udstuen, 349 N.W.2d at 302.
184. Id.
185. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
186. In re Udstuen, 349 N.W.2d at 304.
187. Id. at 304-05.
188. Id. at 303.
189. Id. at 300-01.
190. Id. at 304; see also In re N.C.K., 411 N.W.2d 577, 582 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987)
(following social service professionals' recommendations that "it is essential to the chil-
dren's development that they have a permanent plan as soon as possible, especially
since the children are presently adoptable").
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D. Reasonable Efforts at Reunification Have Failed
Child abuse may warrant termination of the parent's rights
when "following upon a determination of neglect or depen-
dency, or of a child's need for protection or services, reasonable
efforts, under the direction of the court, have failed to correct
the conditions leading to the determination."19" ' Children below
the age of twelve living out of the home for more than a year
may benefit from a presumption that reasonable efforts have
been made. 19 2 There is also a presumption favoring termination
if the parent is chemically dependent, is required to undergo
chemical dependency treatment as part of a case plan, the treat-
ment program is culturally appropriate, the parent fails two or
more times to successfully complete treatment, and the parent
continues to abuse chemicals.
193
For example, In re H.K.19 4 concerned a dependency petition of
a three-year-old child. Although specifics were not given, the
problems leading to the dependency determination were listed
as "chemical dependency and physical abuse."' 95 The child was
placed in foster care and reunification efforts included chemical
dependency treatment for the mother, a battered women's pro-
gram, and parenting classes.'96 The local welfare agency also
provided transportation and a supervisor for visitation between
the mother and child.'97 In addition, the mother received finan-
cial assistance and frequent visits from caseworkers.' 98 The trial
court deemed these to be reasonable efforts and terminated the
mother's parental rights.' 99
Although the court of appeals upheld the termination order,
the court noted that determining the existence of reasonable ef-
forts "requires consideration of the length of the time the county
191. MINN. STAT. § 260.221, subd. 1(b) (5) (1992 & Supp. 1993); see, e.g., In re Clau-
sen, 289 N.W.2d 153 (Minn. 1980); In re M.J.L., 407 N.W.2d 714 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987);
In reA.H., 402 N.W.2d 598 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); In reD.D.K., 376 N.W.2d 717 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1985).
192. See MINN. STAT. § 260.221, subd. 1(b) (5) (i)-(iii) (1992 & Supp. 1993).
193. Id., subd. 1(b)(5)(i)-(v) (1992 & Supp. 1993); see In re H.K., 455 N.W.2d 529,
533 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990); In reClough, 369 N.W.2d 337, 341 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985); In
re Adams, 352 N.W.2d 105, 106 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
194. 455 N.W.2d 529.
195. Id. at 532.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. In re H.K, 455 N.W.2d at 529.
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has been involved and the quality of the efforts given. 2 ° ° Even
in cases of egregious child abuse, this language explicitly in-
structs the local welfare agency to take its time and to expend
significant resources on reunification. While this may be proper
in some cases, no allowance is made for the likelihood of success
or the child's immediate need for a permanent family
relationship.
As a result of the requirement for a lengthy and high quality
effort at reunification, H.K. waited over three years from the fil-
ing of the dependency petition until the court of appeals upheld
the trial court's decision to terminate the mother's parental
rights.20 ' A child psychologist diagnosed the child as suffering
oppositional disorder, post traumatic stress disorder, and
depression.
20 2
E. Conviction for Killing a Parent's Child
Until recently, a parent's conviction for murdering his or her
own child was insufficient to warrant termination of parental
rights as to the remaining children. In the case In re M.D. O.,203
Janet and David Ostlund adopted a fifteen-month-old, develop-
mentally delayed girl named Maria. Mrs. Ostlund was subse-
quently convicted of murdering Maria.20 4
At the criminal trial, there was evidence that the mother had
fed Maria food that was too hot, repeatedly tossed a foam ball at
Maria's face, spanked Maria, slapped Maria, and shaken Ma-
ria.20 5 Other witnesses observed that Maria drooled blood and
once had a black eye.20 6 There was also evidence that Mrs.
200. Id. at 532.
201. Id. at 529-30.
202. Id. at 531.
203. 450 N.W.2d 655 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) [hereinafter M.D.O. 1], rev'd, 462 N.W.2d
370 (Minn. 1990) [hereinafter M.D.O. Ii].
204. M.D.O. I, 450 N.W.2d at 656. Mrs. Ostlund was convicted of murder in the
second degree. Minnesota law provides:
Whoever does any of the following is guilty of murder in the second de-
gree and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than 40 years:
(1) Causes the death of a human being with intent to effect the death of
that person or another, but without premeditation, or
(2) Causes the death of a human being, without intent to effect the death
of any person, while committing or attempting to commit a felony offense
other than criminal sexual conduct in the first or second degree with force or
violence . ..
MINN. STAT. § 609.19 (1992).
205. M.D.O. II, 462 N.W.2d at 372.
206. Id.
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Ostlund abused daycare children in her home; specifically, that
she dropped other children into their cribs and declined to feed
those who could not talk.2 °7
On July 15, 1986, Maria died as a result of severe brain injury
intentionally inflicted by her adoptive mother.2 °8 In September
1986, while awaiting trial, Mrs. Ostlund gave birth to M.D.O.
20 9
and the juvenile court assumed custody of the child. In January
1987, Mrs. Ostlund was sentenced to 105 months in prison.
210
On July 16, 1987, the county petitioned for termination of
Ostlund's parental rights to M.D.O. on grounds that: "(1)
Ostlund had repeatedly refused or neglected to comply with the
duties imposed by the parent-child relationship, and (2) Ostlund
was palpably unfit to be a party to that relationship because of a
consistent pattern of specific conduct and specific conditions
permanently detrimental to the child's health." 1
The trial court dismissed the petition, finding that "Ostlund's
conduct toward Maria showed incidents of abuse but did not es-
tablish a consistent pattern of abuse. 2 1 2 Moreover, the court
concluded that Ostlund did not pose a "current or even foresee-
able danger to M.D.O."12 1  In addition, the child's best interests
"were served by maintaining and strengthening the relationship
with Ostlund."21 4 As a result of this decision, the child was re-
turned to her natural father.
2 1 1
The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, hold-
ing that Ostlund was a palpably unfit mother as a matter of
law.21 6 Given the "consistent pattern of abuse" prior to Maria's
murder and Ostlund's refusal to admit to the intentional assault
on Maria, resulting in a questionable prognosis for therapy, the
appellate court ruled that the palpable unfitness to parent would
continue for the foreseeable future. 1 7
207. Id.
208. M.D.O. I, 450 N.W.2d at 656; M.D.O. II, 462 N.W.2d at 372.
209. M.D.O. I, 450 N.W.2d at 656.
210. M.D.O. II, 462 N.W.2d at 372.
211. Id. at 373.
212. Id. at 374.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. M.D.O. II, 462 N.W.2d at 374.
216. M.D.O. I, 450 N.W.2d 655, 658 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) revd, 462 N.W.2d 370
(Minn. 1990).
217. Id. at 657-658.
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In a dissenting opinion, Judge Klaphake agreed that Ostlund
had engaged in a consistent pattern of abuse toward Maria.218
However, the Judge did not agree "with the conclusion that this
pattern renders Ostlund unable to care for M.D.O. for the rea-
sonably foreseeable future or renders her palpably unfit to
parent. "21
9
In reversing the court of appeals, the Minnesota Supreme
Court held that since a past pattern of abuse was not an essential
element of Ostlund's crime, the court of appeals could not make
this finding as a matter of law.2 20 The court noted that the bur-
den of proving a parent palpably unfit is onerous. 221 Again, the
court noted that, at the time of the TPR trial, the petitioner must
prove a pattern of conduct or specific conditions that are perma-
nently detrimental to the child and that will continue for a pro-
longed, indefinite period of time.2 22
The supreme court found no "consistent pattern of conduct"
or "specific conditions" which were permanently detrimental to
the welfare of M.D.O. 223 Moreover, Ostlund's refusal to ac-
knowledge culpability was not considered permanently detri-
mental to the child. The court noted that Ostlund was fulfilling
numerous case plan requirements 2 2 4 and several professionals
testified that Ostlund could be rehabilitated without admitting
that she had murdered Maria. 225 The court concluded that 'Ja-
net Ostlund may not be the picture of a model parent. Yet few
children would be reared by natural parents if model parents
were the standard.
226
Reacting to the supreme court's decision in M.D. 0., the legis-
lature amended the TPR statute to provide for termination when
218. Id. at 658.
219. Id. at 658-659.
220. M.D.O. II, 462 N.W.2d 370, 376 (Minn. 1990) revg k450 N.W.2d 655 (Minn. Ct.
App.). Two statutes now make "past pattern of abuse" an essential element of the
crime. An assault of a minor is an assault in the third degree "if the perpetrator has
engaged in a past pattern of child abuse against the minor." MINN. STAT. § 609.223,
subd. 2 (1992). Murder in the first degree now includes causing the death of a minor
"while committing child abuse, when the perpetrator has engaged in a past pattern of
child abuse upon the child and the death occurs under circumstances manifesting an
extreme indifference to human life." Id. § 609.185, subd. 5 (1992).
221. M.D.O. II, 462 N.W.2d at 376.
222. Id. at 377.
223. Id. at 378.
224. Id. at 377.
225. Id. at 378.
226. M.D.O. II, 462 N.W.2d at 379 (citation omitted).
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"the parent has been convicted of causing the death of anothei
of the parent's children. '227 Had this statute been in place at the
time of the M.D. 0. decision, the result of the case would likely
have been the same because it is not enough to prove a statutory
ground for termination. The court must still find that termina-
tion would serve the child's best interests. 228 In M.D.0., the
supreme court upheld the lower court's finding that termination
would not serve the child's best interests.229
The amendment to the TPR statute does nothing to protect
those children whose parents kill unrelated children such as day-
care children,23 0 foster children,23' or neighbor children. Like-
wise, the killing of adults, or one of the child's parents, would be
nothing more than a factor to consider under the present termi-
nation statute.232
Most important, the amendment fails to address those cases
where physical and sexual abuse have been inflicted on a child,
but the child has not died. For these children, reunification
with, rather than severance from the abuser remains the primary
goal.
V. PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT TPR STATUTE IN CASES OF
CHILD ABUSE
Minnesota recognizes that physical and sexual abuse places a
child in need of protection.233 Convicted child abusers have the
burden of proving to the court why they should be permitted
visitation with, much less custody of their children. 34
Unfortunately, Minnesota fails to recognize an egregious act
of child abuse, by itself, as a ground for termination of parental
227. MINN. STAT. § 260.221, subd. l(b) (6) (1992 & Supp. 1993).
228. Id., subd. 4.
229. M.D.O. II, 462 N.W.2d at 379.
230. Mrs. Ostlund, a day care provider, allegedly dropped children into their cribs
and did not feed children who could not talk. Id. at 372.
231. This author successfully prosecuted a foster mother for assault in the first de-
gree and attempted murder in the first degree of a foster child. State v. Connie Neal,
Court File No. KX-91-355, Fifth Judicial Dist. (Martin County 1992).
232. The Minnesota Court of Appeals has considered spousal abuse as a factor in a
parental rights termination proceeding. See In reJ.H.D., 416 N.W.2d 194 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1988). In JH.D., the father shot his wife in the presence of the children. Id. at
196-97.
233. MINN. STAT. § 260.015, subd. 2a(2) (1992). See supra notes 75-85 and accompa-
nying text.
234. MINN. STAT. § 518.179 (1992). See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
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rights unless the child dies, is the offspring of a convicted
abuser, and has at least one brother or sister. There are three
serious shortcomings to this approach. First, the current statute
fails to recognize the harm resulting from child abuse. Second,
the current statue places children at risk. Third, the current
statue creates a delay in permanency planning.
A. The Current Statute Fails to Recognize the Harm Resulting From
Child Abuse
The current TPR statute does not specifically refer to the phys-
ical or sexual abuse of a child. This omission fails to recognize
that the abuse of a child, standing alone, should warrant termi-
nation of parental rights when doing so would serve the child's
best interests. The impact of abuse on a child cannot be
overstated.
Abused children share characteristics indicative of a tortured
spirit and body. Older children exhibit both physical and psy-
chological effects of abuse.23 5 Younger abused children also ex-
hibit physical and psychological effects of abuse. 236  For all
children, the effects of abuse can be severe and long-lasting.
235. KAROSOV & LANSING, MANUAL FOR PROSECUTION OF CHILD ABUSE 99 (Minn.
County Attorney's Assn. 1991). Specific behaviors include:
(1) depression;
(2) withdrawal;
(3) poor self image;
(4) chemical abuse;
(5) running away or aversion to going home;
(6) recurrent physical complaints, such as infections, cramping or abdomi-
nal pains, muscle aches, dizziness, gagging and severe headaches;
(7) self mutilation, such as cutting;
(8) suicide attempts;
(9) truancy;
(10) change in school performance;
(11) overtly seductive behavior, promiscuity or prostitution;
(12) eating disorders, such as anorexia, obesity, sudden weight gain or loss;
(13) limited social life;
(14) attention getting or delinquent behavior.
Id.
236. Id. Specific behaviors include the following:
(1) nightmares and other sleeping disturbances;
(2) bedwetting;
(3) elimination problems;
(4) enuresis/encapresis;
(5) explicit sexual knowledge, behavior or language unusual for their age;
(6) withdrawal;
(7) frequent genital infections;
(8) unexplained gagging;
(9) agitation, hyperactivity, irritability or aggressiveness;
(10) loss of appetite.
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Several Minnesota courts have admitted testimony regarding
the characteristics of abused children. In State v. Myers,23 7 an ex-
pert testified that, unlike most crimes, child sexual abuse rarely
occurs only once.238 Young victims of sexual abuse fear that they
will be blamed or punished if they report the abuse.2 9 Young
children are confused because the abuse feels wrong but the per-
petrator contends that the abuse is proper.24 ° In many instances
where one parent perpetrates the abuse, the nonabusive parent
does not believe the child's allegations.241
In State v. Davis,242 the court admitted expert testimony re-
garding characteristics of sexually abused adolescents. 243 The
shame and guilt experienced by adolescents may cause a particu-
lar abused adolescent to engage in "lying, stealing, running
away, [and] sexually acting oUt.
2 4 4
As one physician has noted, child abuse "is an experience that
interferes or has the potential to interfere with a child's normal,
healthy development. It is an experience with which the child
may not be able to cope physically, intellectually or emotion-
ally." 245 An abusive parent shatters the child's self image and
distorts the child's perceptions of power and trust.
2 46
Minnesota's TPR statute finds certain acts toward children to
be so abhorrent that termination is justified. For example, aban-
donment of a child is a ground for termination. 47 Indeed, aban-
donment is presumed in some cases where a parent has no
contact with the child for six months and has no demonstrated
or consistent interest in the child's well being.248 In certain cir-
Id.
237. 359 N.W.2d 604 (Minn. 1984).
238. Id. at 608.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 610.
242. 422 N.W.2d 296 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
243. Id. at 299. But see State v. Danielski, 350 N.W.2d 395, 397-98 (Minn. Ct. App.
1984) (holding that it was error to allow testimony about the characteristics of sexually
abused adolescents).
244. Davis, 422 N.W.2d at 299.
245. DEBRA WHITCOMB ET AL., WHEN THE VICTIM IS A CHILD 16 (1985).
246. Id.
247. In re Staat, 178 N.W.2d 709, 712, 287 Minn. 501, 503 (1970); MINN. STAT.
§ 260.221, subd. 1(b)(1) (1992 & Supp. 1993); see In re Walker, 287 N.W.2d 642, 644
(Minn. 1979); In re D.F.B., 412 N.W.2d 406, 412 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); In re W.R., 379
N.W.2d 544, 548 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
248. MINN. STAT. § 260.221, subd. l(b)(1)(i)-(ii) (1992 & Supp. 1993).
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cumstances, the failure to pay child support is also a ground for
termination of parental rights.249
Obviously, the physical and sexual abuse of a child is abhor-
rent to any person with normal human feelings. Certainly, child
abuse harms the victims at least as much as abandonment or the
failure to pay child support. Certainly, egregious child abuse
should constitute a sufficient ground for termination of parental
rights.
Unlike Minnesota's present statute, some state statutes do spe-
cifically provide that child abuse constitutes an independent
ground for termination of parental rights. In Wisconsin, for ex-
ample, child abuse is a separate and distinct ground for termina-
tion of parental rights. Specifically, the Wisconsin statute
provides:
Child abuse may be established by showing that the parent
has exhibited a pattern of abusive behavior which is a substan-
tial threat to the health of the child who is the subject of the
petition and a showing of either of the following:
(a) That the parent has caused death or injury to a child
or children resulting in a felony conviction.
(b) That, on more than one occasion, a child has been re-
moved from the parent's home by the court... after an adju-
dication that the child is in need of protection or services and
a finding by the court that sexual or physical abuse was in-
flicted by the parent.25°
North Carolina also permits termination of parental rights on
the grounds that a child has been abused. A child is considered
abused when the parent, or another adult responsible for the
child's care, has engaged in any of the following conduct:
a. Inflicts or allows to be inflicted upon the juvenile a serious
physical injury by other than accidental means; or
b. Creates or allows to be created a substantial risk of serious
physical injury to the juvenile by other than accidental means;
or
bl. Uses or allows to be used upon the juvenile cruel or
grossly inappropriate procedures or cruel or grossly inappro-
priate devices to modify behavior; or
c. Commits, permits, or encourages the commission of a vio-
lation of the following laws by, with, or upon the juvenile: first
249. Id., subd. l(b)(3) (1992); see In re S.F., 482 N.W.2d 500, 503 (Minn. Ct. App.
1992); In re M.G., 375 N.W.2d 588, 590 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
250. Wis. STAT. § 48.415(5) (1991-92).
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degree rape . . . second degree rape . . . first degree sexual
offense . . . second degree sexual offense . . . sexual act by a
custodian ... crime against nature ... incest ... preparation
of obscene photographs, slides or motion pictures of the juve-
nile . . . employing or permitting the juvenile to assist in a
violation of the obscenity laws ... dissemination of obscene
material to the juvenile. .. displaying or disseminating mate-
rial harmful to the juvenile.., first and second degree sexual
exploitation of the juvenile ... promoting the prostitution of
the juvenile.. . and taking indecent liberties with the juvenile
... regardless of the age of the parties; or
d. Creates or allows to be created serious emotional damage
to the juvenile. Serious emotional damage is evidenced by a
juvenile's severe anxiety, depression, withdrawal or aggressive
behavior toward himself or others; or
e. Encourages, directs, or approves of delinquent acts involv-
ing moral turpitude committed by the juvenile.
251
If the trial court determines that abuse has occurred, parental
rights must be terminated under the North Carolina statute un-
less the child's best interests dictate otherwise.2 5 2 Minnesota,
like Wisconsin and North Carolina, should recognize egregious
child abuse as an independent ground for termination of paren-
tal rights. Not only does the current TPR statute's failure to in-
clude child abuse result in physical and psychological harm to
251. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-517(1) (Supp. 1993). In one case, the trial court found
that a 23-month-old girl was an abused juvenile. In re Hughes, 330 S.E.2d 213, 218-19
(N.C. Ct. App. 1985). The girl had "stocking" type third degree burns on both feet and
extending six inches up both her legs and first and second degree burns on her but-
tocks. Id. at 214. The burns were caused by approximately 134 degree bath water. Id.
at 215. Although a child would instinctively scramble out of hot water, this child's
burns appeared to result from her "standing flat footed in a tub filled with approxi-
mately six inches of hot water, without enough movement by the child to create splash
marks." Id. The examining doctor concluded that the burns were "non-accidental." Id.
at 214.
In another case a mother "became upset with her [child], struck her with a belt,
and had washed her genital area with sufficient force to cause the child to bleed on at
least three occasions." In re Thompson, 306 S.E.2d 792, 793 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983). The
court found that the injuries to the child did not constitute an injury which creates a
"substantial risk of impairing the health of the child" and, therefore, the injuries did
not rise to the level of abuse under G.S. 7A-517(1). Id. at 795.
252. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.31 (1993); see, e.g., In re Smith, 287 S.E.2d 440, 445
(N.C. Ct. App. 1982) (stating that it is "within the court's discretion to consider such
factors as family integrity in making its decision of whether termination is in the best
interests of the children. The children's best interests are paramount, not the rights of
the parent"); In re Caldwell, 330 S.E.2d 513, 517 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982) (finding that "the
court retains discretionary authority to dismiss the petition in the best interests of the
child").
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child victims of parental abuse, 253 but this failure also contradicts
Minnesota's deep commitment to protect children.25 4
B. The Current Statute Places Children at Risk
The current statute makes termination too difficult in cases of
egregious child abuse. This difficulty means that child victims
may endure further consequences of an abusive relationship.
Although child abuse may fit within the boundaries of several
statutory provisions warranting termination,255 child abuse alone
is an insufficient basis to terminate parental rights under the
present law even if termination would serve the child's best
interests.
In most cases, in order to terminate parental rights, the abuse
must occur over an extended period of time.256 Moreover, the
county must prove that the abusive conditions will continue for
an indefinite, prolonged period of time.257 In most cases, the
local welfare agency is urged to make reasonable efforts at
reunification.258 Indeed, the court is instructed to make specific
findings regarding reunification efforts prior to termination
under any of the statutory grounds.259 If the petitioner proves
all of the above, termination is warranted if it would serve the
child's best interests.260
In the case In re JH.D.,261' requiring the welfare agency to
prove more than abuse before parental rights could be termi-
nated resulted in placing the children with their abusive parents
for an extended period of time.26 2 The children endured fur-
ther neglect and witnessed their father shoot their mother.263
Termination was not finalized until five years after the trial court
had originally found that the children were neglected.264
253. See supra notes 235-49 and accompanying text.
254. See supra part III.
255. Id.
256. See supra notes 125-34 and accompanying text.
257. See supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
258. See MINN. STAT. §§ 260.012(a) (1992); 626.556, subd. 10(a) (1992 & Supp.
1993). See also supra note 40 and accompanying text.
259. MINN. STAT. § 260.221, subd. 5 (1992); see, e.g., In re M.D.O., 462 N.W.2d 370,
378 (Minn. 1990); In reC.K., 426 N.W.2d 842, 847 (Minn. 1988); In reS.N., 423 N.W.2d
83, 87 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
260. MINN. STAT. § 260.221, subd. 5 (1992).
261. 416 N.W.2d 194 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
262. See supra notes 127-43 and accompanying text.
263. In reJH.D., 416 N.W.2d at 196-97.
264. Id.
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In another case, In re B.C.,"' requiring the welfare agency to
prove more than abuse before parental rights could be termi-
nated resulted in two years of visitation between the minor child
and the parent, imprisoned for the murder of another one of
her children.266 These visits were eventually deemed emotion-
ally harmful and termination was accomplished. 67 The children
in In reJH.D. and In re B. C. endured further harm as a result of
the current TPR statute's failure to include child abuse as an
independent ground for termination of parental rights and as a
result of reunification efforts which can take years to complete.
J.H.D. and B.C. are not alone; many other children have also
endured further harm.2 68 The TPR statute must be amended so
that abused children will not risk further harm.
C. The Current Statute Creates a Delay in Permanency Planning
Prior to terminating the parental relationship under any of
the statutory grounds, the court must make findings regarding
efforts at reunification of the family.269 This statutory scheme
fails to recognize that, in some instances, the prospect of reunifi-
cation is so remote that the delay in planning for the permanent
placement of the abused child cannot be justified. More often
than not, cases of egregious child abuse fall into this category.
2 70
In the case In re L.M.M.,271 a mother who sexually and physi-
cally abused her children was subjected to psychiatric evaluations
of herself and her children in "various combinations and in vari-
ous settings."272 Based on these evaluations, the psychologist
concluded that the children "were at risk of physical punishment
in unpredictable patterns" and recommended termination of pa-
rental rights. 2 73 Unfortunately, the court ordered a plan for
reunification which included supervised visitation. 74 A petition
for termination of parental rights was filed, more than one year
265. 356 N.W.2d 328 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
266. Id. at 330.
267. Id. at 331-33.
268. See, e.g., In re H.K., 455 N.W.2d 529 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990); In re M.A., 408
N.W.2d 227 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); In re Udstuen, 349 N.W.2d 300 (Minn. Ct. App.
1984).
269. MINN. STAT. § 260.221, subd. 5 (1992).
270. MAYHALL & NORGARD, supra note 20, at 348.
271. 372 N.W.2d 431 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
272. Id. at 431-32.
273. Id. at 432.
274. Id.
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after the court's initial order placing the children in foster care
and ordering psychological evaluations, because the social work-
ers concluded the plan was not producing substantial
changes. 275 Given the original psychological evaluations, this is
an example of a case where the agency and the court could have
determined the prospect of successful reunification to be so re-
mote that reunification efforts should not have been a prerequi-
site to filing a TPR petition.
The nature of egregious child abuse makes reunification diffi-
cult. Researchers have found that physical abuse of a child "im-
pedes or even prevents the formation of a strong and confident
attachment between infant and parent."276 Such attachment
problems may cause an abused child to become violent or expe-
rience "a schizophrenic type of withdrawal, retreating into a total
psychotic state."277 In describing the difficulty of working with
and reuniting abused children and their parents, one pediatri-
cian observes that "[w] e've got a problem in the area of abuse
and neglect that is far greater than anyone suspected when the
system was set up. We're asking social services to bail out the
ocean with a couple of buckets."
278
According to some researchers, child abuse victims are less
likely to become abusers themselves or to engage in other antiso-
cial behaviors if they can form attachments to adults and peers
other than their abusers.279 Unfortunately, the TPR statute's re-
quirement of reunification efforts means continuing the child's
attachment to the abuser rather than placing the child in a per-
manent, nonabusive home.
VI. A NEW APPROACH
Minnesota's TPR statute should recognize egregious child
abuse as an independent ground for termination of parental
rights. An amendment to the statute must reduce the risk of
reunification efforts in child abuse cases when the abusive par-
ent is likely to continue to abuse the child, expedite permanency
planning, and yet remain within the bounds of the Constitution.
Accordingly, the following proposal is made.
275. Id.
276. MAGID & McKELvEY, supra note 37, at 179.
277. Id. at 175.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 178.
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A. Proposal for Amended Statute
The framework for amending Minnesota's TPR statute can be
found in Minnesota's custody and visitation statute.2 80 This stat-
ute restricts a convicted child abuser's access to his or her chil-
dren.2 8 1 This concept should be employed in termination of
parental rights cases to create a separate and distinct basis for
termination. If a parent is convicted of an egregious act of child
abuse, termination of parental rights is appropriate if it would
serve the child's best interests. 282 Specifically, the statute could
be amended to read as follows:
The Juvenile Court may involuntarily terminate all rights of
a parent to a child upon the parent's conviction of child phys-
ical or sexual abuse. A conviction for child physical abuse or
sexual abuse means conviction under any of the following
statutes for acts against a minor child:
1) Murder in the first, second or third degree under sec-
tions 609.185,283 609.19284 or 609.195;285
280. MINN. STAT. § 518.179 (1992).
281. Id., subd. 1. This section places upon the person seeking custody or visitation
the burden of proving that such access would serve the best interests of the child. Id.
282. MINN. STAT. § 260.221, subd. 4. (1992).
283. Id. § 609.185 (1992). The statute provides in relevant part that whoever does
any of the following is guilty of murder in the first degree: (1) causes the death of
another as a result of premeditation with intent to kill; (2) causes the death of another
while committing or attempting to commit criminal sexual conduct; (3) causes the
death of a minor while committing child abuse when the perpetrator has engaged in a
past pattern of abuse and death occurs under circumstances manifesting an extreme
indifference to life; or (4) causes the death of another while committing domestic
abuse when the perpetrator has engaged in a past pattern of abuse and death occurs
under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to life. Id.
284. Id. § 609.19 (1992). The statute provides in relevant part that whoever does
any of the following is guilty of murder in the second degree: (1) causes the death of
another with intent to cause the death but without premeditation; (2) causes the death
of another without intent to kill while committing or attempting to commit a felony
offense other than criminal sexual conduct; (3) causes the death of another without
intent to kill while intentionally inflicting or attempting to inflict bodily harm, when an
order for protection is in effect, and the victim is the person designed to receive protec-
tion under the order. Id.
285. Id. § 609.195 (1992). The statute provides in relevant part that whoever does
any of the following is guilty of murder in the third degree: (1) causes the death of
another without intent by perpetrating an act eminently dangerous to others and evinc-
ing a depraved mind without regard for human life; (2) proximately causes the death of
another without intent by unlawfully selling, giving away, bartering, delivering, ex-
changing, distributing, or administering a controlled substance. Id.
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2) Manslaughter in the first degree under section
609.20;286
3) Assault in the first, second or third degree under sec-
tions 609.221,287 609.222288 or 609.223;289
4) Kidnapping under section 609.25;29
0
5) Depriving another of custodial or parental rights
under section 609.26;291
6) Soliciting, inducing or promoting prostitution involv-
ing a minor under section 609.322;292
286. Id. § 609.20 (1992). The statute provides in relevant part that whoever does
any of the following is guilty of manslaughter in the first degree: (1) intentionally
causes the death of another in the heat of passion provoked by words or acts, which
would provoke a person of ordinary self-control under similar circumstances, provided
that the crying of a child does not constitute provocation; (2) causes the death of an-
other while committing or attempting to commit a misdemeanor or gross misdemeanor
with such force and violence that death or great bodily harm was reasonably foresee-
able, and the circumstances do not constitute murder in the first or second degree. Id.
287. MINN. STAT. § 609.221 (1992). The statute provides in relevant part that who-
ever assaults another and inflicts great bodily harm is guilty of assault in the first degree.
Id.
288. Id. § 609.222 (1992). The statute provides in relevant part that a person is
guilty of assault in the second degree when that person assaults another with a danger-
ous weapon or assaults another with a dangerous weapon and inflicts substantial bodily
harm. Id.
289. Id. § 609.223 (1992). The statute provides in relevant part that a person is
guilty of assault in the third degree when that person assaults another and inflicts sub-
stantial bodily harm, or assaults a minor if the perpetrator has a past pattern of abuse
against the minor. Id.
290. Id. § 609.25 (1992). The statute provides in relevant part that a person is guilty
of kidnapping when that person confines or removes from one place to another any
person without the person's consent or in the case of a child under age 16, without the
parent's consent, and holds the person for ransom, or as a hostage, or to facilitate the
commission of a felony or flight, or physically harms or terrorizes the victim, or holds
the victim in involuntary servitude. Id.
291. Id. § 609.26 (1992). The statute provides in relevant part that whoever inten-
tionally does any of the following may be charged with depriving another of custodial or
parental rights: (1) conceals a minor child from the child's parent with the intent to
deprive that parent of parental rights or conceals the child from a person having a right
to visitation or custody; (2) takes or fails to return a minor child in violation of a court
order which has transferred legal custody; (3) takes or fails to return a minor child in
violation of a court order to intentionally deprive a parent of visitation or custody
rights; (4) takes or fails to return a minor child after the start of an action relating to
child visitation or custody; (5) retains a child in Minnesota with the knowledge that the
child was taken out of another state in violation of any of the above provisions. Id.,
subd. 1.
292. MINN. STAT. § 609.322 (1992). The statute provides in relevant part that a per-
son is guilty of soliciting, inducing or promoting prostitution involving a minor when
that person intentionally: (1) solicits, promotes, or induces a minor under the age of
16 to practice prostitution, or (2) solicits, promotes, or induces a minor between the
ages of 16 and 18 to practice prostitution by means of force or uses a position of author-
ity to induce the minor to practice prostitution. Id., subd. 1.
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7) Receiving profit from prostitution involving a minor
under section 609.323;293
8) Criminal sexual conduct in the first degree under sec-
tion 609.342;294
9) Criminal sexual conduct in the second degree under
section 609.343;295
10) Criminal sexual conduct in the third degree under sec-
tion 609.344, Subd. 1 (c), (f) or (g);
296
293. MINN. STAT. § 609.323 (1992). The statute provides in relevant part that a per-
son is guilty of receiving profit from prostitution involving a minor when that person:
(1) intentionally receives profit from the prostitution of a minor under the age of 16
and that person is not a prostitute or patron; or (2) intentionally receives profit from
the prostitution of a minor between the ages of 16 and 18 and that person is not a
prostitute or patron. Id., subd. la.
294. MINN. STAT. § 609.342 (1992). The statute provides in relevant part that a per-
son who engages in sexual penetration with another person is guilty of criminal sexual
conduct in the first degree when: (1) the complainant is under 13 years of age and the
actor is more than 36 months older than the complainant; (2) the complainant is at
least 13 years of age but less than 16 and the actor is more than 48 months older than
the complainant, in a position of authority over the complainant, and uses this author-
ity to cause the complainant to submit; (3) circumstances existing at the time of the
penetration cause the complainant to believe great bodily harm is imminent; (4) the
actor is armed with what complainant reasonably believes is a dangerous weapon and
the weapon is used or threatened to be used to cause the complainant to submit; (5)
the actor causes personal injury to the complainant and either uses force or coercion,
or knows the complainant is mentally impaired, incapacitated, or physically helpless;
(6) the actor is aided or abetted by one or more accomplices who cause the complain-
ant to submit; or (7) the actor has a significant relationship with the complainant and
the complainant was under the age of 16 at the time of the penetration. Id., subd. 1 (a)-
(g).
295. MINN. STAT. § 609.343 (1992). The statute provides in relevant part that a per-
son who engages in sexual contact with another person is guilty of criminal sexual con-
duct in the second degree when: (1) the complainant is under 13 years of age and the
actor is more than 36 months older than the complainant; (2) the complainant is at
least 13 years of age but less than 16 and the actor is more than 48 months older than
the complainant, in a position of authority over the complainant, and uses the authority
to cause the complainant to submit; (3) circumstances existing at the time cause the
complainant to believe great bodily harm is imminent; (4) the actor is armed with what
complainant reasonably believes is a dangerous weapon and the weapon is used or
threatened to be used to cause the complainant to submit; (5) the actor causes personal
injury to the complainant and either uses force or coercion, or knows the complainant
is mentally impaired, incapacitated, or physically helpless; (6) the actor is aided or abet-
ted by one or more accomplices who cause the complainant to submit; or (7) the actor
has a significant relationship with the complainant and the complainant was under the
age of 16 at the time of the contact. Id. See, e.g., State v. Wermerskirchen, 483 N.W.2d
725, 731-32 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (reversing conviction and ordering new trial where
defendant was charged with second degree sexual conduct with daughter because the
state openly encouraged the misuse of Spreigi evidence under Rule 404(b) of the Min-
nesota Rules of Evidence).
296. MINN. STAT. § 609.344, subd. 1(c),(f),(g) (1992 & Supp. 1993). The statute
provides in relevant part that a person who engages in sexual penetration with another
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11) Solicitation of a child to engage in sexual conduct
under section 609.352;297
12) Incest under section 609.365;298
13) Malicious punishment of a child under section
609.377;299
14) Neglect of a child under section 609.378.3o o
This proposal is similar to a Wisconsin statute providing for
termination of parental rights upon a felony conviction for caus-
ing death or injury to any child 30 ' and a North Carolina statute
allowing termination of parental rights upon conviction under
person is guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the third degree when: (1) the actor uses
force or coercion to accomplish the penetration; (2) the actor has a significant relation-
ship with the complainant and the complainant was at least 16 years of age but under
18 at the time of the penetration; or (3) the actor has a significant relationship with the
complainant and the complainant was at least 16 years of age but under 18 at the time,
and the actor or actor's accomplice used force or coercion, the complainant suffered
personal injury, or the sexual abuse involved multiple acts committed over an extended
period of time. Id.
297. Id. § 609.352, subd. 1-2 (1992). The statute provides in relevant part that a
person who is 18 years of age or older is guilty of soliciting a child to engage in sexual
conduct when that person commands, entreats, or attempts to persuade a child under
15 years of age to engage in sexual conduct with the intent to engage in sexual contact
of the individual's primary genital area, sexual penetration, or sexual performance. Id.
298. Id. § 609.365 (1992). The statute provides in relevant part that a person is
guilty of incest when that person has sexual intercourse with another nearer of kin than
first cousin with knowledge of the relationship. Id. See, e.g., In reC.B., No. C5-89-1107,
1989 WL 138953, at *3-4 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 21, 1989) (affirming trial court judg-
ment terminating parental rights of parents due partly to the fact that incestuous rela-
tionships and sexual abuse had existed for many years in the family even though the
children were not directly abused).
299. MINN. STAT. § 609.377 (1992). The statute provides in relevant part that a par-
ent, legal guardian, or caretaker is guilty of malicious punishment of a child when that
person by an intentional act or a series of intentional acts evidences unreasonable force
or cruel discipline, which is excessive under the circumstances. Id,
300. Id. § 609.378 (1992 & Supp. 1993). The statute provides in relevant part that a
parent, legal guardian, or caretaker is guilty of neglect of a child when: (1) that person
willfully deprives a child of necessary food, clothing, shelter, health care or supervision
appropriate to the child's age, and (2) that person is reasonably able to make the neces-
sary provisions and the deprivation harms or is likely to harm the child's physical,
mental, or emotional health. Id., subd. 1 (a). A parent, legal guardian, or caretaker is
guilty of endangering a child's person or health when: (1) that person intentionally or
recklessly causes or allows a child to be placed in a situation likely to substantially harm
the child's physical, mental, or emotional health or cause the child's death; or (2) that
person knowingly causes or permits the child to be present where any persons are sell-
ing or possessing a controlled substance. Id., subd. 1 (b). In addition, a parent, legal
guardian, or caretaker is guilty of endangering a child by firearm access when that
person intentionally or recklessly causes a child under 14 years of age to be placed in a
situation likely to substantially harm the child's physical health, or cause the child's
death, as a result of the child's access to a loaded firearm. Id., subd. 1 (c).
301. See supra note 250 and accompanying text.
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enumerated criminal statutes.3 °2 Wisconsin and North Carolina
also require that a court must find that termination of parental
rights would serve the child's best interests. 30 3
Although this proposal would not protect children whose
abusers are neither charged nor convicted, it is increasingly rare
not to prosecute serious acts of child abuse. According to the
Bureau of Justice Statistics, ninety percent of those arrested for
crimes against children are prosecuted.
30 4
Child abuse victims whose parental abusers are not convicted
may still receive the benefit of the TPR statute. However, the
local welfare agency will need to place the abuse within one of
the other statutory grounds for termination.
B. Benefits of the Amended Statute
There are at least four benefits to the amended statute. First,
the amendment recognizes child abuse as a social ill that war-
rants termination of parental rights. Although the amendment
itself may not deter egregious acts of child abuse, the amend-
ment reflects society's intolerance of such conduct and the de-
sire to separate children from an abusive environment.
Second, the amended statute reduces a child's risk of further
abuse. Under the present statute, reunification efforts are neces-
sary even when the prospect of successful reunification is re-
mote. As a result, children have endured further abuse"0 5 or
have experienced emotional trauma from ongoing contact with
an abuser. 0 6
Under the amended statute, reunification efforts are not re-
quired. If the parent has been convicted of one or more acts of
child abuse and the local welfare agency can establish that termi-
nating the parent's rights would serve the child's best interests,
the child would not have to endure ongoing contact with the
perpetrator.
Third, the amended statute expedites permanency planning
after the perpetrator of the abuse has been convicted. Under
the present statute, reunification efforts are necessary prior to
302. See supra note 251 and accompanying text.
303. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.31 (1989); Wis. STAT. § 48.415 (5) (a),(b)(1991-92).
304. WHrrcoMB ET AL. supra note 245, at 6.
305. See, e.g., In re M.A., 408 N.W.2d 227, 232 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (noting that
child was abused by the parent during supervised visitation in a welfare agency).
306. See, e.g., In reJ.H.D., 416 N.W.2d 194, 196-97 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (noting
that the parents failed to provide for the children's emotional needs).
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terminating. °7 When a child abuser is charged, the trial court
may prohibit contact between the abuser and the child pending
trial °.30  Accordingly, the local welfare agency may have to delay
visitation, family counseling, and other services until the crimi-
nal proceeding is finalized. When the criminal case ends, the
local welfare agency must then wait for documented failure of
reunification efforts before it institutes a TPR petition.3"9
Under the amended statute, the local welfare agency will still
have to wait until the criminal case ends. However, if the case
ends in a conviction, the agency will no longer have to attempt
reunification. 310 If terminating the parent's rights would serve
the child's best interests, the agency may immediately file a TPR
petition. In addition, the wait for the outcome of the criminal
proceedings need not be long. An accused child abuser or the
prosecutor can demand that a trial be held within sixty days after
a not guilty plea.
311
Fourth, the amended statute may reduce the number of times
the child victim will have to testify about the abuse. Under the
present statute, the child may have to testify about the abuse in
both the criminal and TPR trials.312 Under the amended statute,
307. MINN. STAT. § 260.221, subd. 5 (1992).
308. See MINN. R. CRIM. P. 6.02, subd. 1 (b).
309. Terminating parental fights on the basis of a repeated failure to comply with
parental duties requires "reasonable efforts" by the agency to reunite the family. MINN.
STAT. § 260.221, subd. 5 (1992). The Minnesota Court of Appeals has the "greatest
concern" in upholding a termination on the basis of palpable unfitness if an abusive
parent has not been allowed ongoing contact with the victim. See generally In rejH.D.,
416 N.W.2d at 194.
Terminating parental rights on the basis that a child is neglected and in foster care
requires an evaluation of the agency's efforts to reunite the abuser and the victim. Id.
Obviously, terminating parental rights on the basis that reasonable efforts at reunifica-
tion have failed also requires reunification efforts. Id.
310. The court will still need to make findings as to any reunification efforts. MINN.
STAT. § 260.221, subd. 5 (1992). However, an agency should be able to prove that ter-
mination of parental rights would serve the best interests of the child if the agency
shows that reunification efforts will be unsuccessful.
311. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 11.10.
312. An out of court statement from a child below the age of 10 may be admissible
in a criminal trial if certain conditions are met. One of these conditions is that the
child testify or be unavailable and there is other corroborating evidence. MINN. STAT.
§ 595.02, subd. 3(b) (i)-(ii) (1992). In order to reduce the trauma of testifying, the
court may order that the testimony of an abused child below the age of 12 be con-
ducted by closed circuit television or be recorded for later showing. Id., subd. 4(a)(1)-
(2) (1992). For a detailed discussion of the admissibility of child hearsay in abuse cases,
see Michelle M. Zehnder, A Step Forward: Rule 803(25), A New Approach to Child
Hearsay Statements, 20 WM MrrCHELL L. REv. 875 (1994).
[Vol. 20
48
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 3 [1994], Art. 4
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol20/iss3/4
TERMINATING PARENTAL RIGHTS
proof of the conviction is all that is required. If any testimony is
needed, it may be on the broader issue of whether terminating
the parent's rights would serve the child's best interests. Fur-
ther, under the amended statute, it may be possible to prove that
terminating the parent's rights would serve the child's best inter-
ests based on the testimony of counselors, teachers, doctors, the
guardian ad litem, and other professionals who have worked
with the child victim. In such cases, the child victim may never
have to testify.
C. The Constitutionality of the Amended Statute
1. Due Process
The United States Supreme Court has "little doubt that the
Due Process Clause would be offended '[i]f a State were to at-
tempt to force the breakup of a natural family, over the objec-
tions of the parents and their children, without some showing of
unfitness .. "313 However, it was not until 1981 that the
United States Supreme Court actually considered what the due
process clause requires in a TPR proceeding.
314
In Lassiter v. Department of Social Services,3 15 the Court held that
the due process clause does not mandate the appointment of
counsel for indigent parents in every TPR case.3 1 6 Nonetheless,
Justice Blackmun stated that it was "not disputed that state inter-
vention to terminate the relationship between [a parent] and
[the] child must be accomplished by procedures meeting the
requisites of the Due Process Clause."3 7
In Santosky v. Kramer,3" 8 the Supreme Court overruled a New
York statute which allowed termination by a "fair preponderance
of the evidence" if the child was "permanently neglected."
31 9
This statute permitted removal of a child from the parental
home upon a showing of neglect.320 The state was then obli-
313. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) (quoting Smith v. Organization of
Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 862-63 (1977) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
314. Susan E. Simanek, Note, State Must Offer Clear and Convincing Proof of Unfitness to
Cut Off Parental Rights, 66 MARQ. L. REV. 585, 591 (1983).
315. 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
316. Id. at 33.
317. Id. at 37 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
318. 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
319. Id. at 747.
320. Id. at 748.
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gated to work toward reunification.32 If the state made diligent
efforts at reunification but the parent substantially or continu-
ously failed to maintain contact with the child or plan for the
child's future, the child was deemed "permanently neglected." '322
A "dispositional" hearing would then take place, at which time a
parent's rights would be terminated if doing so would serve the
child's best interests. 23
In finding the New York statute unconstitutional under the
due process clause, the court in Santosky evaluated "the process
due" in a TPR proceeding by applying "three distinct factors:"
1) the private interests affected by the proceeding;
2) the risk of error created by the State's chosen procedure;
and
3) the countervailing governmental interest supporting use
of the challenged procedure.
324
In considering the private interests affected, the court noted
that, in a TPR proceeding, the government seeks not merely to
infringe upon a parent's right to the care and custody of a child,
but to end it.3 25 Accordingly, the private interest affected
"weighs heavily against use of the preponderance standard at a
state-initiated permanent neglect proceeding. "326
In considering the risk involved in an erroneous deprivation
of a parent's rights, the court in Santosky noted that the local
welfare agency may have significant sums of money to expend on
a TPR proceeding and that even if the agency fails initially, "it
always can try once again to cut off the parents' rights after gath-
ering more or better evidence. '327 The court further noted that
TPR proceedings often "employ imprecise substantive standards
that leave determination unusually open to the subjective values
of the judge. ' 28 When combined with a fair preponderance of
the evidence standard, "these factors create a significant pros-
pect of erroneous termination. '"329
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 748.
324. Id. at 754 (citing Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
325. Id. at 759.
326. Id.
327. Id. at 764.
328. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 762.
329. Id. at 764.
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In considering the government's interest in "preserving and
promoting the welfare of the child and a fiscal and administra-
tive interest in reducing the cost and burden of such proceed-
ings," ' the Santosky court found that requiring a clear and
convincing standard of proof would be "consistent with both in-
terests.""'1 This is because the state's interest in termination
arises only when it is clear that a parent is unfit, and because
judges are familiar with the clear and convincing evidence stan-
dard and can apply it."3 2
Based on these three factors, the proposed statute would not
infringe on the due process clause. A parent's fundamental in-
terest in the care and custody of the child will be served by a
procedure requiring a conviction of felony child abuse, and
clear and convincing evidence that TPR would serve the child's
best interests. Since a criminal conviction is necessary, the par-
ent will be afforded the constitutional or statutory rights associ-
ated with a criminal trial, including the right to counsel,333 the
right to a jury trial,33 4 the protection against self incrimina-
tion, 35  the protection against unreasonable search and
seizure, 3' and proof beyond a reasonable doubt.337  These
rights would not be afforded in a civil TPR proceeding if the
local welfare agency was called on to prove Child abuse.
Moreover, the mere conviction of a parent will be insufficient
to terminate parental rights. The trial court must determine
whether the abuse is such that the child's best interests would be
served by termination. This may involve consideration of such
factors as the level of attachment to the parent and the likeli-
hood of adoption.
330. Id. at 766.
331. Id.; see also In re Rosenblom, 266 N.W.2d 888, 889 (Minn. 1978) (stating that
due process does not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt to terminate parental
rights because "it is not clear that justice would be served by applying this standard...
Its use might instead exalt the parents' rights and ignore the child's welfare").
332. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 767.
333. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
334. Id.
335. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
336. U.S. CONsr. amend. IV.
337. MINN. STAT. § 611.02 (1992). See generally State v. Kaster, 211 Minn. 119, 300
N.W. 897 (1941).
1994]
51
Vieth: The Mutilation of a Child'S Spirit: A Call for a New Approach to
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1994
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
2. Equal Protection.
The United States Supreme Court has held that the freedom
of personal choice in family matters is a fundamental liberty in-
terest protected by the Constitution. 338 Thus, a statutory provi-
sion allowing termination of parental rights upon conviction for
certain acts of abuse must serve a compelling state interest
39
The United States Supreme Court has stated that "the state has
an urgent interest in the welfare of the child. '3 4  Indeed, the
entire community has an interest "that children be both safe-
guarded from abuses and given opportunities for growth into
free and independent well-developed ... citizens. "341
The state's urgent interest in protecting children from physi-
cal and sexual abuse would likely sustain a constitutional attack
on equal protection grounds. This is because the amended stat-
ute will safeguard the child from abuse by severing ties to the
abuser. By expediting the TPR process, the statute will enhance
the child's opportunity for growth into a free and well developed
citizen. 342 This will be done upon proof beyond a reasonable
doubt that the parent is an egregious child abuser, and by clear
and convincing evidence that terminating the parent's rights as a
result of the abuse would serve the child's best interests.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Minnesota Legislature has responded appropriately to
child abuse by enacting legislation in the criminal, child protec-
tion, and family codes. Unfortunately, Minnesota's termination
of parental rights statute fails to recognize child abuse as any-
thing more than a factor to consider in a TPR proceeding, un-
less a child dies and has a brother or sister. Therefore, under
current law the local welfare agency must initiate reunification
efforts even when the abuse is egregious and likelihood of
reunification is poor. This statutory scheme risks physical and
338. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 748 (citing Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 255; Smith v. Organization
of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 845 (1977); Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499
(1977); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974); Stanley v. Illi-
nois, 405 U.S. 645, 651-52 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944);
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 399 (1923)).
339. See Davis v. Davis, 297 Minn. 187, 189-90, 210 N.W.2d 221, 223-24 (1973).
340. Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981).
341. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944).
342. Id.
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emotional harm to the child and causes an unconscionable delay
in permanency planning. A more efficient and humane ap-
proach would allow termination when a parent is convicted of
egregious acts of child abuse and when terminating the parent's
rights would serve the child's best interests. Accordingly, the
Minnesota Legislature should amend the TPR statute.
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